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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Cases
Held
for
Nos.
82-185,
82-246,
82-259,
Boston
Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP
No. 82-206, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et
~ al.
~ 82-22 ~ Menl]?his Fire Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al.
~

I am not sure who should write the "hold memo" on these
cases.
Inasmuch as I prepared the order in the Boston
Firefighters · cases, I am circulating a memo on the cases
held for them.
In these petitions, the Union and the Memphis Fire
Department challenge the modification of a 1980 consent
decree on the grounds that the modification impermissibly
abrogated the operation of a bona fide seniority system.
In 1974 the City of Memphis entered a consent decree
with the United States in the context of a suit under Title
VII, 42 u.s.c. §1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment alleging
race and sex discrimination in the City's hiring and
promotion practices.
In the decree, the City did not admit
any illegality, but agreed to specific interim hiring goals
for lower level workers.
The 1980 consent decree at issue
here was entered in the context of a class action commenced
in 1977 by respondent Stotts alleging that the Fire
Department's hiring and promotion policies continued to
violate Title VII, 42 u.s.c. §1981, and 42 u.s.c. §1983.
Again, the City did not admit any illegality, but agreed to
the establishment of specific hiring and promotional goals.
One year
later,
the City announced a
personnel
reduction
1.n nonessential
services,
which was
to be
accomplished in accordance with the last-hired, first-fired
seniority system contained in the City's memorandum of
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understanding with the Union. After an evidentiary hearing,
at which the petitioner Union was allowed to intervene, the
District Court modified the decree to enjoin the City from
applying a layoff pol icy based on seniority insofar as it
would decrease the percentage of minorities currently
employed in certain positions in the Fire Department.
On appeal by the City and the Union, CA6 upheld the
challenged modification.
It reasoned that the District
Court had authority to modify the decree under either of two
theories: {1) that the City had undertaken a contractual
duty under the decree to make reasonable, good faith efforts
to meet the minority hiring and promotion goals, that
economic hardship could not excuse performance, and that
respondent Stotts could compel specific performance of the
City's obligation; or,
{2)
that
the District Court's
continuing jurisdiction provided authority for modification
of the decree in light of changed circumstances.
TheCA
also held that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion
in modifying
the decree in a manner that
conflicted with the provisions of the seniority system. The
court cited three possible bases for the District Court's
authority to supersede the operation of the seniority
system: {1) the strong policy favoring voluntary settlements
which is embodied in Title VII; {2) the Supremacy Clause,
which would permit overriding the seniority provisions if a
§1983 violation had been established; and {3) the City's
agreement to the prov1s1on of the decree empowering the
trial court to enter "such further order as may be necessary
or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree."
The petitions present a merits issue similar to that
which the Court did not reach in the Boston Firefighters
cases because of the potential mootness problem.
One
relevant difference here, however, is that, unlike the
Boston Firefighters cases, there has never been either a
finding or admission that the City violated any federal law.
These facts make the remedial relief granted by the District
Court's modification
even more
questionable
than
the
modification in Boston Firefighters. The general problem of
balancing the need to ensure progress toward affirmative
action goals and the need to protect the interests of
innocent third-parties under a seniority system is of
obvious importance.
There
is one factual difficulty with this case.
Respondents argued below that no valid seniority rights were
affected by the modification because the Union's agreement

3.

with the City was void as a matter of state law. · The CA
declined to resolve this question.
I do not think this
difficulty presents a barrier to review at this time.
Although the CA might be faulted for failing to address a
potentially dispositive state law issue if the question
would have avoided resolution of a difficult constitutional
issue, it appears that the CA rested its decision more on
federal statutory principles than constitutional principles.
There is some ambiguity ih this regard, however, since entry
of the consent decree pretermitted an adjudication of the
basis of the City's alleged liability.
On balance, I think
the lurking state law question would present at most a basis
for remanding these cases after this Court's decision on the
merits.
I recommend the petitions be granted and consolidated.
Sincerely,
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No. 82-229, Memphis Fire Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al.
I am not sure who should write the "hold memo" on these
cases.
Inasmuch as I prepared the order in the Boston
Firefighters cases, I am circulating a memo on the cases
held for them.
In these petitions, the Union and the Memphis Fire
Department challenge the modification of a 1980 consent
decree on the grounds that the modification impermissibly
abrogated the operation of a bona fide seniority system.

~the

entered~l-uconsent

In
City of Memphis
decree
with the~ed States in the context of a suit under Title
VII, 42 u.s.c. §1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment alleging
race and sex discrimination in the City's hiring and
promotion practices.
In the decree, the City did not admit
any illegality, but agreed to s
'fie 1nterim hiring goals
for lower level workers.
e
onsent ecree a
1ssue
here was entered in the context
class action commenced
in 1977 by respondent Stotts alleging that the Fire
De artrnent's hi in
and promotion policies continued~
vio ate Title VII, 42 U.
1981, and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Again, the City did not admit any illegality, but agreed to
the establishment of specific hiring and promotional goals.
One year
later,
the City announced a
personnel
reduction
1n nonessential
serv1ces,
which was
to be
accomplished in accordance with the last-hired, first-fired
seniority system contained in the City's memorandum of
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understanding with the Union. After an evidentiary hearing,
at which the petitioner Union was allowed to intervene, the
District Court modified the decree to enjoin the City from
applying a layoff pol icy based on seniority insofar as it
would decrease the percentage of minorities curr~ntly
employed in certain positions in the Fire Departmen~ • .
On appeal by the C'i ty and the Union, CA6 upheld the
challenged modification.
It reasoned that the District
Court had authority to modify the decree under either of two
theories: (1) that the City had undertaken a contractual
duty under the decree to make reasonable, good faith efforts
to meet the minority hiring and promotion goals, that
economic hardship could not excuse performance, and that
respondent Stotts could compel specific performance of the
City's obligation;
or,
(2)
that
the District Court's
continuing jurisdiction provided authority for modification
of the decree in 1 ight of changed circumstances.
The CA
also held that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in modifying
the decree in a manner that
conflicted with the provisions of the seniority system. The
court cited three possible bases for the District Court's
authority to supersede the operation of the seniority
system: (1) the strong policy favoring voluntary settlements
which is embodied in Title VII; (2) the Supremacy Clause,
which would permit overriding the seniority provisions if a
§1983 violation had been established; and (3) the City's
agreement to the provision of the decree empowering the
trial court to enter "such further order as may be necessary
or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree."
The petitions present a merits issue similar to that
which the Court did not reach in the Boston Firefighters
cases because of the potential mootness problem.
One
relevant difference here, however, is that, unlike the
Boston Firefighters cases, there _ has... never been either . a
findin or admission that the Clty~iolated an r eaerai law.
These fac s rna e the reme ial relief granted by t e D1strict
Court's modification
even more
questionable
than
the
modification in Boston Firefighters. The general problem of
balancing the need to ensure progress toward affirmative
action goals and the need to protect the interests of
innocent third-parties under a seniority system is of
obvious importance.
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difficult
with this case.
Respondents argue
e w
no va 1d seniority rights were
affected by the modification because the Union's agreement
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with the City was void as a matter of state law. · The CA
declined to resolv e this question.
I do not think this
difficulty presents a barrier to review at this time.
Although the CA might be faulted for failing to address a
potentially dispositive state law issue if the question
would have avoided resolution of a difficult constitutional
issue, it appears that the Cb rested its decision . more on
federal statutory princi les than const i tut i onal pr 1nc i p ies.
There 1s some amo1gu1 y in this regard, however, since entry
of the consent decree pretermitted an adjudication of the
basis of the City's alleged liability. On balance, I think
the lurking state law question would present at most a basis
for remanding these cases after this Court's decision on the
merits.
I recommend the petitions be granted and consolidated.
Sincerely,
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Cases
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for
Nos.
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82-246,
82-259,
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Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP
No. 82-206, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et
~ al.

~ Memphis

Fire Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al.

After I circulated the hold memorandum in these cases,
I received from the Clerk's Office Respondents' Suggestion
of Mootness. Respondents argue that there have been similar
developments to those in the Boston Firefighters case which
make this case moot.
Respondents therefore urge the Court
to vacate and remand for consideration of mootness.
According
to
respondents,
who
document
their
information only with a Memphis newspaper article, all
employees previously laid off have been recalled to work.
All fire officers who were temporarily demoted due to the
fiscal layoffs, with one exception, have been returned to
their pre-layoff rank.
The one officer who has not been
restored to his pre-layoff rank was unaffected by the
District Court's modification because he had the lowest
seniority of any officer, black or white, in his job
classification. Further, the City's fiscal year 1984 budget
makes provision for
three new positions in this job
classification, so even this one officer should be returned
to his original rank eventually.
After
a
response
has
been
received
from
the
petitioners, I will circulate a supplemental memorandum to
the Conference.
Sincerely,

juvrtmt <qourt o-f t4t ~nitth .:§taft%
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make this case moot.
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to vacate and remand for consideration of mootness.
According
to
respondents,
~o
document
their
information only with a Memphis ~ ewspaper article, all
employees previously laid off have been recalled to work.
All fire officers who were temporarily demoted due to the
fiscal layoffs, with one exception, have been returned to
their pre-layoff rank.
The one officer who has not been
restored to his pre-layoff rank was unaffected by the
District Court's modification because he had the lowest
seniority of any officer, black or white, in his job
classification. Further, the City's fiscal year 1984 budget
makes provision for
three new positions in this job
classification, so even this one officer should be returned
to his original rank eventually.
After
a
response
has
been
received
from
the
petitioners, I will circulate a supplemental memorandum to
the Conference.
Sincerely,
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MEMORANDUM TO THE .CONFERENCE
Cases Held for Nos. 82-185, 82-246, 82-259, Boston
Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP
No. 82-206, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et
~al.

~Memphis

Fire Dep't, et al. v. Stotts, et al.

Petitioners have filed a
Suggestion of Mootness setting
this controversy is not moot.

response to Respondents'
forth several reasons why

Petitioners
contend
that
here--unlike
the Boston
Firefighters case, in which the Massachusetts legislation
proscribed future layoffs of the reinstated employees for
fiscal reasons--there is absolutely no assurance against
future layoffs in Memphis for fiscal reasons.
In addition,
respondents have failed to sustain their "heavy" burden,
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979), of
demonstrating that there is ·no reasonable expectation of
future layoffs.
Moreover, the District Court's orders have continuing
effect; they have not expired by their own terms and impose
continuing obligations on petitioners.
Therefore, as the
decree is presently interpreted by the District Court, any
future layoffs would be controlled by the modifications.
Petitioners also point to the continuing adverse impact
of the layoffs on affected employees.
Although these
employees
have
been
reinstated,
several
collateral
consequences of the layoffs remain. One effect has been to
render laid-off non-minority firefighters less senior for
the purpose of future job decisions and entitlements.
For
example, seniority is · a relevant consideration in future
promotion, and the loss of service time during the layoff
period has impaired the affected employees' expectations of

~~t , ·r (!r-~ ~~ J~~-~
C) · c,~ '> ~
~K

·,

2.

future promotion.
Also, those firefighte 'r s entitled under
municipal charter (City of Memphis Charter §67) to promotion
to the rank of captain after 30 years' service will be
delayed in their realization of this entitlement. Affected
employees continue to suffer from the loss of comparative
seniority for purposes o~ future layoffs and a decreased
priority in bidding on certain jobs and job transfers.
Finally, there is _ the loss of pay occasioned by the layoffs.
Finally, petitioners contend that, even if the Court
otherwise concludes that this controversy is moot, the Court
should grant review because the underlying dispute is one
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Because of
attrition in the ranks of department personnel (through
retirement, resignations, discharges, and the like), a
municipality often would be able to reinstate previously
laid-off employees prior to review of the merits issue.
Based on the points made by petitioners, it would
appear that this controversy is not moot under the standards
set forth in County of Los Angeles v. Davis, supra.
The
two-pronged test of Davis requires that:
"(1) it can be said with assurance that 'there is
no
reasonable
expectation
that
the
alleged
violation will recur, ••. , and
"(2) interim relief or events have completely and
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation." ~u.s., at 631 (citations omitted).
~ "\0

Given the fact that here, unlike the guarantee provided
by the Massachusetts legislation, there is no apparent
assurance that the reinstated employees will not be subject
to future layoffs, I do not think that respondents have met
their burden of proving
that there is no reasonable
expectation of future layoffs.
With respect to the second
prong of the Davis test, this case is also different from
the Boston Firefighters situation. There the Massachusetts
civil service scheme provided that any period of layoff for
fiscal reasons would not affect seniority status for
purposes of promotion.
The same apparently is not true
here.
~iven
the collateral consequences of the layoffs
identified by petitioners above, it cannot be said that
interim events have completely eradicated the effects of the
alleged violation.

3.

In my view, the controversy does not appear moot.
will vote to grant the petitions.
Sincerely,
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Question Presented

Whether a trial court may modify a consent decree between a
municipal employer and a group of black employees to avoid the
effects of a city-wide layoff

1

~---

conducted on a "last-hired, first-

fired" basis, where the consent decree is silent with respect to
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Statutes

Section 703(h) of Title VII (42

u.s.c.

§2000e-2(h)) provides,

in relevant part:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system, •.. provided that ~s are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, •.. "
Section 706(g) of Title VII (42

u.s.c.

§2000e-5(g)) provides,

in relevant part:
"No order of the court shall require... the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin or in violation of section 704(a) ."

B.

Facts

In 1974,

the City of Memphis entered into a consent decree

with the Justice Dep't to settle a Title VII suit.

The Justice

Dep't claimed that the City had been guilty of race and sex discrimination in hiring and promotion for various municipal positions, including firefighter.
to

remedy

any disadvantage

past discrimination.

The purpose of the 1974 decree was
to blacks and

women

resulting

from

The decree required the City's good faith

...

efforts

to achieve

specified

hiring goals.

The City expressly

refused to admit to any misconduct.
In 1980,

the City entered

into another consent decree with

two groups of plaintiffs representing blacks in the Fire Department.

The consent decree established specific hiring and promo-

tion goals with

respect to minority representation

Th~~ stated

Depart-::: .

that

should fill at least 50% of all vacancies.
indicated
promotions.

that

qualified minorities

in the Fire

qualified minorities
The

~ tional~

rece~-or-of

should

all

The decree also provided that the trial court would

retain jurisdiction to make "such further orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree."
The decree did not mention the effect it would have on any subse- ~
quent

layoffs

-

or

its

effect

on

the

City's

seniority

system.

Again, the decree contained a disclaimer of any past discrimination on the part of the City.
On May 4, 1981, the City announced that it planned to reduce
the

number

sponse

of

city employees

to deficits

in

in non-essential

the City's

budget.

services

in

The City planned

reto

base its layoff policy on the city-wide union seniority of individual employees. 1

Under the terms of the layoff plan,

officers would be demoted.

39 fire

Of that group, 23 were black and 14

1 There is a dispute over whether the Union had a legally
enforceable contract with the City. The provision for the
seni~ em was contained in a "Memorandum of
Understanding." The CA6 noted that the memorandum might not be
emforceable under Tenn. law, but the court saw no need to decide
the question.
679 F.2d, at 564 n.20.

·.

of

the

blacks

decree.
hired

had

recieved

their

promotions

under

the consent

The plan also would have laid off 15 of the 18 blacks

under

nounced,

the

consent

On

decree.

the day

the

plan was

an-

resps obtained a TRO restraining the City from laying

off or reducing in rank any minority employee in the Memphis Fire
Department.

c.

Decisions Below

$.

After
layoffs,

an evidentiary hearing,
with

the TC found

resulting demotions,

that the proposed

were circumstances

parties to the consent decree had not anticipated.
found

that

the

layoffs

and demotions would

retrogressive effect on the gains made

have

that

the

The TC also
a

substantial

in minority hiring that

had taken place under the consent decrees.

Because this was the

sort of result that the consent decree was intended to avoid, the
~~-~ u-t I~J>O
TC modified the 9eoree to minimize the disruptive effect the lay-------~--~~4~---

offs would have in the efforts to acheive the goals of the decree.

As modified

the

consent

decree would

prevent

minority

employment from being affected disproportionately by unanticipated layoffs.

The TC used the modified consent decree as the basis

of an injunction prohibiting the City from conducting the layoffs
in a way that would decrease the percentage of black Lieutenants,

-

Drivers,

-

Inspectors,

Department. 2

and

Privates employed

in the Memphis Fire

The TC ordered the City to submit a new plan that

Footnote{s} 2 will appear on following pages.

•,

'

~.

;

.'
..
1

would comply with the terms of the injunction.
The City and the Firefighters Union appealed the TC's decision.

The CA6 affirmed the TC, reasoning that the TC had author- ~

"---- - - --,

ity to construe the decree as precluding application of the seniority system under either of two theories.
ed

that

budgetary hardships

could

not

First, the CA6 not-

relieve

the City of

its

contractual duties to make reasonable, good faith efforts to meet
the minority hiring and promotion goals.

Second, the CA6 pointed

out that under the terms of the decree, the TC retained jurisdiction to modify the decree to take changed circumstances into account.

The CA6 reasoned that the TC had not abused its discre-

tion by modifying the decree in a way that conflicted with the
provisions

of

the

provisions

that

City's

protect

seniority
bona

fide

system.

Despite

seniority

statutory

systems,

the

CA6

stated that the policy favoring settlement of lawsuits permits a
TC to further the purpose of a consent decree at the expense of a
valid

seniority

that a TC

should

system.

In

be allowed

the

alternative,

to override a

the

CA6

reasoned

seniority system to

effectuate the policies underlying Title VII.

Finally, the CA6

opined that the TC could have derived its authority to abrogate
the seniority system from the clause in the decree that gives the
TC continuing jurisdiction to carry out the purposes of the decree.

2 The TC later expanded its order to cover Fire Prevention
Supervisors, Fire Alarm Operators, and Clerk Typists .

•

..

II.

DISCUSSION

Petitioners' Contentions

A.

Petrs contend that the TC should have looked only to the four
corners of the consent decree in determining whether any modification was warranted.
fer

to

layoffs

or

To the extent that the decree did not re-

to

the

city-wide

seniority

system,

abused its discretion in making modifications.

the

TC

Petrs also main-

tain that the modification ordered was outside the remedial authority of the TC under Title VII.

As the petrs read Title VII,

bona fide seniority systems are protected from any tampering by

--

the courts.
Title VII
basis of

The TC's action also contravenes the policy behind
by

punishing

their color.

innocent white employees
Finally,

solely on

the

petrs submit that if the deci-

sions of the TC and the CA6 are allowed to stand, it will have a
chilling

effect

on

the

use

of

consent

decrees

as

a

means

of

achieving racial balance in municipal workforces.

B. Respondent's Contentions

Resp's first line of defense is that this controversy is moot.
Resp submits that the preliminary injunction was only intended to
preserve
The

the

status

quo

established

injunction accomplished

fects

on

white

employees,

under

the

consent

decree.

that purpose with only minimal efall

of

whom

have

been

reinstated.

There are no lingering adverse effects to the injunction and this

...
'

'

f

..

.,

.,

situation is unlikely to arise again in Memphis.
resp contends

that

the Court must find

On the merits,

that the TC abused

its

discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction in order to reverse the CA6.

There was no abuse of discretion because the TC

only protected

the gains

consent decree.

that had

already been made under

the

In doing this, the TC was carrying out the ex-

press purpose of the decree and did not go beyond the four corners of the document.
race-conscious

Resp notes that the TC did not impose a

alternative plan,

but allowed the City to adopt

any plan that would not have a discriminatory impact on blacks.
Finally,

resp

argues

that abrogation of

a

bona fide

seniority

system does not violate the letter or spirit of Title VII.

C.

SG's Contentions as amicus

The SG relies primarily on the strong federal policy in favor
of bona-fide seniority systems.
gation

of

such

a

system

in

The SG maintains that the abro-

favor

of

individuals who have

not

shown that they were victims of discrimination is a violation of
Title VII.

The SG characterizes the TC's injunction as a "retro-

active effort to confer constructive seniority rights," a result

/

the Court rejected
(1977) •

The

SG

in Teamsters v.

also

feels

that

United States,
any

attempt

to

u.s.

324

restrict

the

431

City's employment policies when those policies are based on an
attempt to discriminate is a violation of Title VII.

According

to the SG the Court will create a constitutional conflict between
the 5th and 14th Amendments if it affirms the CA6.

D.

Analysis

1.

mootness

The Court set out the test for determining whether a centroversy is live in County of Los Angeles v. Davis,

said

with

expectation ..• '
(2)

interim

'there

is

no

reasonable

that the alleged violation will recur,

relief
the

omitted).

Regarding

or

events

effects

in~urphy

has never held

that

assurance

eradicated

stated

625,

Under that test the resp must show that: "(1) it can

631 (1979).

be

440 U.S.

of

the

have

the

completely

alleged

possibility

v. Hunt, 455

u.s.

of

478,

that a mere physical or

was sufficient to satisfy the test •...

and

... , and

irrevocably

violation."

(citations

recurrence,

the Court

482

(1982):

"The Court

theoretical possibility
If this were true, virtu-

ally any matter of short duration would be reviewable.
we have said that there must be a
'demonstrated probability'

Rather,

'reasonable expectation' or a

that the same controversy will recur

involving the same complaining party." 3
Petrs point out that the layoffs in 1981 were the first
the 162 year history of Memphis.

in

Petrs maintain that the City is

now in healthy financial condition and that even if layoffs are

3 Because the complaining party (usually the petr) is the only
litigant who will try to keep the litigation alive by
demonstrating the probability of recurrence, this language does
not really comport with the long-standing rule that the resp has
a "heavy burden" of showing mootness. United States v. W.T.
Grant Co. , 3 4 5 U . S • 6 2 9 , 6 3 2-6 3 3 ( 19 53) •

'·
'

.'

needed the TC would not resort to the same remedy.

Resp's argu-

ment is that there are no assurances that future layoffs will not
recur and prompt the TC to issue another injunction.

Unlike the

---

Boston Firefighters case of last term, there has been no intervening legislation that guarantees that future fiscal problems in
Memphis will not result in personnel reductions in the fire department.4
I tend to think that the parties have not shown a reasonable
probability that Memphis will experience more layoffs in the fu----------------~~
~---------------ture.
I feel certain that layoffs will occur raising the same
issues as this case in some locale, but it is mere speculation to
assume that they will occur in Memphis.

Thus, the first prong of

the Davis mootness test has been met.
Because

Davis

expressly

held

that both prongs of

the

test

must be met before a case becomes moot, you must determine whether

the

City's

eradicated

the

rehiring
effects

of
of

laid
the

off

alleged

...

firefighters
violation."

"irrevocably
Petrs

z-4
~I-'

1>1/

have ~........,
~

- - - - - - - - - - - " ? '/::.._

<,,,

4 The parties ~ isagree on the continuing effect of the TC's
preliminary injunction. Resp maintains that the TC intended the
injunction only to apply to the 1981 layoffs and that a new
injunction would have to be issued to apply to any future
layoffs.
Petrs contend that the preliminary in j unction is still
in effect and will stay in effect indef i n i tely. Petrs are
correct in their assertion that the TC d'
not limit the scope of
the in jqp c~ ion to the 1981 layoffs. Nor does the lnJunc
ve
a rry sort oi an expiration date. Nevertheless, the TC based the
injunction on the effect that the original proposed plan would
have on specific individuals and styled the injunction as
preliminary rather than permanent.
If the need for personnel
reductions were to reappear, the TC would have to reevaluate the
need for relief in light of new employmen t s t at i st i cs an d the
effect of any new layoff plan.

described three consequences of the injunction that continue to
affect members of the Memphis Fire Department.
firefighters
month 1 s

worth

who
of

were

laid

seniority

off
to

for
the

retained under the injunction. 5

a

month

black

First, the white
in

1981

firefighters

lost

one

who were

This lost seniority may affect

those whites in future promotion decisions, job transfer opportunities, and layoff situations.

Also, the municipal charter pro-

vides that firefighters are automatically promoted to the rank of
captain after 30 years of service.
month 1 s

seniority wi 11

automatic

promotions.

have
In

The firefighters who lost a

to wait
addition,

an

extra month

petrs

argue

for

their

that

white

firefighters who were demoted because of the injunction lost the
opportunity to take examinations to qualify for promotions.
Resp tries to rebut each of these contentions.
submits

that

firefighters

petr

City made

the choice not

to accumulate seniority during

First, resp

to allow
the

layoff

laid off
period.

Resp points out that the injunction does not refer to seniority
credits during the layoff period and that the City has the power
to change that result if it wants to.

Resp also notes that even

if the Court reverses the CA6, the laid off workers will not regain their seniority.

Regarding the 30 year automatic promotion

5 In the CA6 petrs also sought compensatory damages, including
an element of wages lost during the layoff period. The CA6 held
that non-minority furloughed employees could not recover
compensatory damages under Title VII.
Petrs do not challenge
this aspect of the CA6 1 s opinion. Had petrs decided to their
claim for compensatory damages, that claim might constitute a
continuing "effect of the alleged violation."

•

1

'

.

•'

policy, resp argues that the policy only applies to firefighters
hired before September 16, 1976.

All the men who were laid off

were hired between 1979 and 1981.
no automatic promotion rights.

Thus, the injunction affects

Finally,

resp submits that only

one promotion examination was given during

the period at

issue

and all those firefighters affected by the injunction were eligible to take the exam.
Assuming
filed

a

that

resp

reply brief

consequences exist.

has his

yet),

facts

it seems

straight

{petrs have not

that no continuing adverse

Presumably, the Court could order the City

to give those affected by the injunction seniority credits, but
petrs have not asked for that kind of relief and the City could
achieve that result more easily on its own.

If the Court were

writing on a clean slate, I would recommend that the case be dismissed

as

moot.

The

Court may

feel

that having

let

the case

progress this far,

it should take this opportunity to decide the

merits.

other

Although

similar

cases

are

sure

to

arise,

in

Murphy the Court limited the mootness inquiry to a determination
of whether the issue will recur with respect "to the complaining
party."

As a

result,

the temporary nature of

layoffs suggests

that the Court will encounter similar mootness problems in future
cases.

2. the merits

A threshold question
should be.

.. '

is what the proper standard of

review

The parties seem to agree that a reviewing court must

determine whether the TC abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction.

To grant an

that the plaintiffs have a
merits and

injunction,

the TC must find

stong possibility of success on the

that the plaintiff would

the absence of the injunction.

suffer

irreparable harm in

Presumably, "the merits" in this

case would be an action to have the consent decree construed or
modified in such a way that it would prohibit the City's use of
the seniority system in carrying out a personnel reduction.

As

the CA6 pointed out, the first prong of the test was met because
resp, in fact, convinced the TC to read the decree as prohibiting
strict application of

the last-hire, first-fire procedure.

Al-

though a finding of irreparable harm seems questionable in hindi.e.,

sight

all

laid

off

firefighters

were

rehired

rather

quickly), the TC was justified in thinking that the layoffs would
be

indefinite.

-----.

Thus,

the question becomes whether

the

form of

In answering that question, I do

the injunction was acceptable.

not think an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate.

The injunction did more than just preserve the status quo

while awaiting a trial on the merits.

The TC construed the de-

cree and ordered the City to submit a layoff plan that satisfied
that

construction.

I

think

that

this

aspect

of

the

TC order

should be subject to ordinary standards of appellate review.
A consent decree is nothing more than a contract that is subject

to

continuing

judicial

-----------------------u.s. 673

Armour & Co., 402

enforcement.

--

In

United

States

v.

(1971}, the Court discussed the role

of the courts in construing consent decrees:

.

'

.•

......

'•

"Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies
as much of those opposing purposes as the respective
parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.
For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must
be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the
parties to it.
Because the defendent has, by a right
guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has given that waiver as it is
written, and not as it might have been written had the
plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation." Id., at 681-682.
The parties agree that the decree did not make any express reference to future layoffs or to the operation of the City's seniority system.

Resp nevertheless argues that implicit in the terms

and goals of the decree is a requirement that the City could not
backtrack on any progress it had made in minority hiring.
~

\.._,.

Like-

wise, the CA6 noted that resp was entitled to ask the TC to use
its

equitable

powers

goals of the Decrees."

"to compel compliance with
679 F.2d, at 561. 6

the

terms

and

The CA6 reasoned that

the TC could order specific performance of the City's obligation
to "employ reasonable, good faith efforts to fulfill the goal of
increasing minority representation."

The CA6 relied on "hornbook

6 Another argument is that the clause in the decree that allows
the TC to "retain[] jurisdiction of this action for such further
orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this decree" permits the TC more latitude in
construing the decree than that permitted under Armour. This
argument o~s the fact that the consent decree in Armour
contained a prov1sion similar to the "retain jurisdiction" clause
of the the 1980 decree. Paragraph 18 of the Armour decree
provided that "the court should retain jurisdiction of the case
'for the purpose of taking such other action or adding to the
foot of this decree such other relief, if any, as may become
necessary or appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement of
this decree.'" 402 u.s., at 676.

page 15

bench memo: Firefjnhters v. Stotts

?u ~tllM-'1
'

/;f

JA4Ifi:;,.f

IV. .

law" for the proposition that the City's economic hardship would

~

j;k~

not excuse non-performance under the decree.
~

The CA6 construction of the decree is questionable.

The de-

l\

cree provides: "Goals established herein are to be interpreted as J
objectives which require reasonable, good faith efforts on the _
part of the City, and not as rigid quotas."

At no time has the

- --

City expressed its intent to welsh on its committment to increase

-

-

-

long-term minority representation in the Fire Department.

Resp

do not allege that the City acted in bad faith 7 and neither the
TC nor the CA6 made such a finding.

Although the CA6 is correct

in its assertion that economic hardship ordinarily is not a defense to a breach of contract action, economic hardship is relevant in determining whether the City complied with its duty to
act with reasonableness and good faith.

Under the Court's lan-

guage in Armour & Co., the CA6 should have either found an express reference in the decree to the operation of the seniority
system or made a finding that the City had acted in bad faith,
thereby brearching one of the terms of the decree.
As an alternative to its construction of the decree, the CA6

-----

found that the TC was entitled to fuocHfy the deere~ in light of

-

"cha';
_g_e_d..,..__c_lr•r
-- c- u-m-s"7t-a-nces."

u.s.

-

In United States v. Swift

&

-

Co.,

286

106, 114-115 (1932), the Court stated that a court can modi-

fy a consent decree only when changed circumstances have turned

7 rn its brief, resp argues that there is no evidence in the
record that blacks were not discriminated against in the layoffs.
Resp's Brief, at 62. Th~assertion conflicts with the TC's
express finding that the City had no discriminatory purpose in
proposing the layoffs.

Nc;

the decree into "an instrument of wrong."
general principal,

the CA6 stated that:

While recognizing this
"Modification is proper

where it has been demonstrated in an evidentiary hearing that new
and unforeseen conditions have created a hardship."
563.

The CA6 went on to find

that the proposed

679 F.2d, at
layoffs would

impose an undue hardship on the blacks who had been hired as a
result of the consent decree.
tation of

the Swift & Co.

overlooks

the

f i ref igh ter s
Moreover,
culties

rule is correct,

hardship that
who

were

laid

the TC' s
off

in

the CA6's reasoning

order

had on those white

place of

protected

blacks.

I have trouble seeing why the advent of fiscal diffi-

turned

might have
~

Assuming that the CA6's interpre-

the

rendered

decree

into an

"evil device."

the decree temporarily

The

layoffs

inoperable,

but the

decree itself had no undesirable effect on resps.

Thus, the de-

cree was not transformed into an "instrument of wrong."
Because I disagree with the CA6's construction and modification theories,
part of

I would conclude that any remedial action on the

the TC was improper.

If you disagree, you must decide

whether the TC exceeded its equitable remedial authority by circumventing the City's seniority system. 8

The argument in favor

of the TC's order is that the TC was only acting under the terms

8 There is some dispute over whether the city-wide seniority ~~
system was bona fide.
The TC stated in conclusory fashion that
the system was not bona fide because its effect was
discriminatory. Petition, at A78. The CA6 disagreed and found
that the TC erred in ruling the the seniority system was not bona
fide.
679 F.2d, at 551 n.6. Resp has not challenged the CA6's
holding.

)

"

.
f

..

.~,.

of the decree.

There are two facets to this argument.

The first

is that the City implicitly consented to this sort of relief by
entering the decree.

This argument, of course, assumes that the

decree can be construed
that it

~yoff

cree.

Thus,

'\

as

imposing

requirement on the City

blacks hired pursuant to the terms of the de-

abrogation of the seniority system is necessary to

carry out the terms of the decree.
that

a

the decree was

never

The City and the Union assert

intended to have this result and

if

they had known that resp had this result in mind they would not
have agreed to it.
decree obligates

As discussed above, I do not think that the

the City to protect

the

jobs of blacks hired

under the terms of the decree against the effects of unforeseen
layoffs.
The second facet of

resp's argument

is that the TC derived

its remedial authority from a provision of the decree which provides:

"The Court retains

jurisdiction of

this action for

such

further orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this decree."

The CA6 reasoned that the TC could

"use this derivative authority to temporarily override the provisions of the Union's collective bargaining agreement."
at 567.
the TC,

Petrs argue that whatever
it could

under

Title VII.

order

that

the

not order

the derivative authority of

remedy that would be unavailable

Petrs view the preliminary

City

bestow

hired under the decree.
tive seniority"

a

679 F.2d,

"constructive

injunction as an

seniority"

on

blacks

Petrs assert that an award of "construe-

is prohibited under Title VII where the benefi-

ciaries of the remedy are not victims of discrimination and where

the use of the seniority system has no discriminatory purpose.
See 42

u.s.c.

Again,

§§2000e-2(h) and 2000e-5(g).

I

think

that

petrs

have

the

better

argument.

The

Court has stated that Congress intended Title VII to leave bona
fide

seniority systems

in

tact even if
~

perpetuating discrimination.

u.s.

324,

348-355

(1977)

they had the ef feet of

See Teamsters v. United States, 431

and the extensive legislative history

cited in the Union's brief at 28-40.

Furthermore, as you stated

in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455

u.s.

385, 401 (1982)

(Powell, J., concurring), "a violation of Title VII is a prerequisite

to

disturbing

system •.. "
fact,
law,
seems

rights

under

a

bona

fide

seniority

No violation of Title VII has been established.

In

the City expressly refused to admit to "any violations of
rule,

or

regulation"

ludicrous

to me

In short,

in the consent decree.

that

a

TC

should

be

able

to

impose

it
an

unconsented to remedy under a provision of a consent decree that

ll

coul~ot

impose in a Title VII suit.

III. CONCLUSION

The case
versed.

is moot.

If

it is not moot,

the CA6 should be re-

The lower courts' decisions, whether viewed as construe-

tion or modification of the consent decree were wrong.
the TC' s

reading of

the consent decree was proper,

Even if

it exceeded

its remedial authority by abrogating the City's seniority system.

·.(.

·'

,.

,.

'

,,
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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AND

82-229
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82-206

FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1784,
PETIT;ONER
~ ~
CARL W. STOTTS ET AL.

82-229

MEMPHIS FIRE DEPARTMENT, ET
PETITIONERS

v.
CARL W. STOTTS, ETC., ETAL.

~ 1./UW IY(

AL.,~ ~
)j /( Uf ~
.
ht..,'"\ ~ 10 ~{_.ft.)

•
~

~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF,.,.-:- 1 _/.. ~
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
~ vru.-- Jt...!.:...-.
[January-, 1984]

~~~~.

JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners challenge the Court of Appeals' approval of an ~
order enjoining the City of Memphis from following its se- ~~
niority system in determining who must be laid off as a result L/ ~
of a budgetary shortfall. Respondents contend that the in- r ~ d:.junction was necessary to effectuate the terms of a Title VII ~dA ~ ~ .... '·.
consent decree in which the City agreed to undertake certain . - · ,- ~
obligations in order to remedy past hiring and promotional jl~j:=. ~
practices. Because we conclude that the order cannot be
,-I(
justified, either as an effort to enforce the consent decree or ~
as a valid modification, we reverse.
~

6

I
~~
In 1977 respondent Carl Stotts, a black holding the position
of fire-fighting captain in the Memphis, Tennessee, Fire De- ~~--~
partment, filed a class action complaint in the United States
~
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The
complaint charged that the Memphis Fire Department and (4__~~~
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other city officials were engaged in a pattern or practice of
making hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. §2000e et seq., as well as 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and
1983. The District Court certified the case as a class action
and consolidated it with an individual action subsequently
filed by respondent Fred Jones, a black fire-fighting private
in the Department, who claimed that he had been denied a
promotion because of his race. Discovery proceeded, settlement negotiations ensued, and in due course, a consent decree was approved and entered by the District Court on April
25, 1980.
The stated purpose of the decree was to remedy the hiring
and promotion practices "of the Department with respect to
blacks." 679 F. 2d 541, 575-576 (CA6 1982) (Appendix).
Accordingly, the City agreed to promote 13 named individuals and to provide backpay to 81 employees of the Fire Department. It also adopted the long-term goal of increasing
the proportion of minority representation in each job classification in the Fire Department to approximately the proportion of blacks in the labor force in Shelby County, Tennessee.
However, the City did not, by agreeing to the decree, admit
"any violations of law, rule or regulation with respect to the
allegations" in the complaint. I d., at 574. The plaintiffs
waived any further relief save to enforce the decree, ibid.,
and the District Court retained jurisdiction "for such further
orders as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this decree." I d., at 578.
The long-term hiring goal outlined in the decree paralleled
the provisions of a 1974 consent decree, which settled a case
brought against the City by the United States and which applied citywide. Like the 1974 decree, the 1980 decree also
established an interim hiring goal of filling on an annual basis
50 percent of the job vacancies in the Department with qualified black applicants. The 1980 decree contained an addi-
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tional goal with respect to promotions: the Department was
to attempt to ensure that 20 percent of the promotions in
each job classification be given to blacks. Neither decree
contained rovisions for layoffs or reductio~d
ne1 er awarded any competitive seniority.
e
ecree 1.
did require that for purposes of promotion, transfer, and as- (,
signment, seniority was to be computed "as the total senior- 1
ity of that person with the City." !d., at 572.
In early May, 1981, the City announced that projected
budget deficits required a reduction of non-essential personnel throughout the City Government. Layoffs were to be
based on the "last hired, first fired" rule under which citywide seniority, determined by each employee's length of continuous service from the latest date of permanent employment, was the basis for deciding who would be laid off. If a
senior employee's position were abolished or eliminated, the
employee could "bump down" to a lower ranking position
rather than be laid off. As the Court of Appeals later noted, \
this layoff policy was adopted ursuant to the seniorit system mentione m e 1
decree an . . . incorporated in
the City'smemoranctum witli1he Union." 679 F. 2d, at 549.
On May 4, at respondents' request, the District Court en,{). C.
tered a temporary restrai_!!!ng_order forbidding the' layoff of
any blacK employee. Tlie Union, which previously had not
been a party to either of these cases, was permitted to intervene. At the preliminary injunction hearing, it appeared
that 55 then-filled positions in the Department were to be
eliminated and that 39 of these positions were filled with employees having "bumping" rights. It was estimated that 40
least-senior employees in the fire-fighting bureau of the Department 1 would be laid off and that of these 25 were white
and 15 black. It also appeared that 56 percent of the em1

The Memphis Fire Department is divided into several bureaus, including fire-fighting, alarm office, administration, apparatus, maintenance, and
fire prevention. Of the positions covered by the original injunction, all but
one were in the fire-fighting bureau.

82-206 &
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ployees hired in the Department since 1974 had been black
and that the percentage of black employees had increased
from approximately 3 or 4 percent in 1974 to llYz percent in
1980.
On May 18, the District Court entered an order granting a
preliminary injunction. The District Court noted that the
consent decree "did not contemplate the method to be used
for reduction in rank or lay-off," and that the layoff policy
was in accordance with the City's seniority system and was
not adopted with any intent to discriminate. Nonetheless,
concluding that the proposed layoffs would have a racially
discriminatory effect and that the seniority system was not a
bona fide one, the District Court ordered that the City "not
apply the seniority policy insofar as it will decrease the percentage of black lieutentants, drivers, inspectors and privates that are presently employed .... " On June 23, the
District Court broadened its order to include three additional
classifications. A modified layoff plan, aimed at protecting
black employees in the seven classifications so as to comply
with the court's order, was presented and approved. Layoffs pursuant to the modified plan were then carried out. In
certain instances, to comply with the injunction, non-minority employees with more seniority than minority employees
were laid off or demoted in rank. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed despite -its conclusion that the District Court was
wrong in holding that the City's seniority system was not
bona fide. 679 F. 2d, at 551 n. 6. Characterizing the principal isssue as "whether the district court erred in modifying
the 1980 Decree to prevent minority employment from being
affected disproportionately by unanticipated layoffs," id., at
2
The City ultimately laid off 24 privates, three of whom were black.
Had the seniority system been followed, six blacks would have been among
the 24 privates laid off. Thus, three, white employees were laid off as a
direct result of the District Court's order. The number of whites demoted
as a result of the order is not clear from the record before us.

~
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551, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court
had acted properly. After determining that the decree was
properly approved in the first instance, the court held that
the modification was permissible under general contract principles because the City "contracted" to provide "a substantial
increase in the number of minorities in supervisory positions"
and the layoffs would breach that contract. I d., at 561. Alternatively, the court held that the District Court was authorized to modify the decree because new and unforeseen
circumstances had created a hardship for one of the parties to
the decree. Id., at 562-563. Finally, articulating three
alternate rationales, the court rejected petitioners' argument that the modification was improper because it conflicted
with the City's seniority system, which was immunized from
Title VII attack under § 703(h) of that Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2(h).
The City and the Union filed separate petitions for certiorari. The two petitions were granted, - - U. S. - (1983), and the cases were consolidated for oral argument.
II

We deal first with respondents' claim that these cases are
moot. They submit that since the white employees laid off
as a result of the injunction were restored to duty only one
month after their layoff, and since all others who were demoted have now been offered back their old positions, the
preliminary injunction no longer has any real effect. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that the case is not moot because the laid-off white employees lost a month~ paY..,a~d~e. rity that have not been restored. In addition, petitioners
assert, those who umped own" and accepted lesser positions in lieu of being laid off will also have backpay claims if
their demotions were unjustified. These continuing__ im_nacts
on those affected by the injunction are sufficient to avoid any
claim of mootness, petitioners argue. We agree.

'J1L> /-

~
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Undoubtedly, not much money and seniority are involved,
but the amount of money and seniority at stake does not determine mootness. As long as the parties have a concrete
interest in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot
notwithstanding the size of the dispute. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496-498 (1969). Moreover, a month's
pay is not a negligible item for those affected by the injunction, and the loss of a month's competitive seniority may later
determine who gets a promotion, who is entitled to bid for
transfers or who is first laid off if there is another reduction
in force. These are matters of substance, it seems to us, and
enough so to foreclose any claim of mootness. Cf. Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 727, 756 (1976); Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 496-498; Bond v. Floyd, 385
U. S. 116, 128 n. 4 (1966). 3
Respondents' only rejoinder is that the City and the Union
are at one with respect to these issues and that the City need
only award or restore whatever backpay and seniority it feels
the laid-off employees are entitled to. The difficulty with
this position is that it ignores the reality of the situation.
Respon<fents insisted on the issuance of a preliminary injunction; pursuant to that injunction, which declared the seniority
system to be invalid, a modified layoff plan was presented
and approved by the District Court. That plan mandated a
departure from the seniority system and the layoff and demotion of senior white employees. The Court of Appeals, although vacating the District Court's invalidation of the seniority system, affirmed the injunction and the modified plan.
Unless the Court of Appeals' judgment is set aside, the layoffs and demotions of the white employees were in accordance with law. It would be quite unreasonable to expect the
City to pay out money to which the employees have no legal
3
Unlike Firefighters Union v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, U. S.
(1983) no intervening state legislation affects the issues in this case.
Thus, there is no reason to remand the present case for a consideration of
the effect of that legislation as there was in Boston Firefighters.

I
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claim or to take some other action enhancing the relative position of the affected employees in the work force except pursuant to some claim of right. Hence the effects of the order
obtained at respondent's request have not been "completely
and irrevocably eradicated," County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979), and the City and the Union both
have a real and justifiable interest in having the lawfulness of
the injunction adjudicated. 4 We therefore turn to that
question.

III

The issue at the heart of this case is whether the District
Court exc eeded i ts .I!OWers in eii'tering an InJUnction requiring w hite emPlOYees to b'elaid off, when the otherwise applicable seniority system 6 would have called for the layoff of
black employees with less seniority. We are convinced that
the Court of Appeals erred in resolving this issue and in affirming the District Court.
A

•we thus need not resolve the heavily debated issue of whether these
cases are not moot because they present issues "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911).
• Respondents contend that the memorandum of understanding between
the Union and the City is unenforceable under state law, citing Fulenwider
v. Firefighters Association Local Union 1784, 649 S. W. 2d 268 (Tenn.
1982). However, the validity of that memorandum under state law is unimportant for purposes of the issues presented in this case. First, the
Court of Appeals assumed that the memorandum was valid in reaching its
decision. 679 F. 2d, at 564 n. 20. Since we are reviewing that decision,
we are free to assume the same. Moreover, even if the memorandum is
unenforceable, the City's seniority system is still in place. The City unilaterally adopted the seniority system citywide in 1973. That policy was
incorporated into the memorandum of understanding with the Firefighters
Union in 1975, but its citywide effect, including its application to the Fire
Department, continues irrespective of the status of the memorandum.

82-206 &
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tion that because the City was under a general obligation to
use its best efforts to increase the proportion of blacks on the
force, it breached the decree by attempting to effectuate a
layoff policy reducing the percentage of black employees in
the Department even though such a policy was mandated by
the seniority system adopted by the City and the Union. A
variation of this argument is that since the decree permitted
the District Court to enter any later orders that "may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree," 679 F . 2d, at 578 (Appendix), the City had agreed in
advance to an injunction against layoffs that would reduce
the proportion of black employees. We are convinced, however, that both of these are improvident constructions of the
consent decree.
It is to be recalled that the "scope of a consent decree must \
n __.J
be discerned within its four corners, a na nOtoy ~ce to
0 -~
what rmglifsatlscy £Fie purposes of one of the parties to it" or
~
by what "might have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation."
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673, 681-682
(1971). Here, as the District Court reco@i.zed, there is no ~
mention ofiayoffs or ~ons within the four corners of the
_; ~ •• Jn-. "'J
~
Decree; nor is There any suggestion of an intention to depart
,~,-~~from the eXIsting semor1ty system or om e 1 y s arrange
on.
e cannot believe that the
parties to the decree thought that the City would simply disregard its arrangements with the Union and the seniority
system it was then following. Had there been any intention
to depart from the seniority plan in the event of layoffs or demotions, it is much more reasonable to believe that there
would have been an express provision to that effect. This is
particularly true since the decree stated that it was not "intended to conflict with any provisions" of the 1974 decree, 679
F . 2d, at 574 (Appendix), and since the latter decree expressly anticipated that the City would recognize seniority,
id., at 572. It is thus not surprising that when the City

6

.

'

.
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anticipated layoffs and demotions, it in the first instance
faithfully followed its preexisting seniority system, plainly
having no thought that it had already agreed to depart from
it. It therefore cannot be said that the express terms of
the decree contemplated that such an injunction would be
entered.
The argument that the injunction was proper because it
carried out the purposes of the decree is equally unconvincing. The decree announced that its purpose was "to remedy
past hiring and promotion practices" of the Department, id.,
at 575-576, and to settle the dispute as to the "appropriate
and valid procedures for hiring and promotion," id., at 574.
The decree went on to provide the agreed-upon remedy, but
as we have indicated, that remedy did not include the displacement of white employees with seniority over blacks.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that the "remedy",
which it was the purpose of the decree to provide, would not
exceed the bounds of the remedies that are appropriate
under Title VII, at least absent some express provision to
that effect. As our cases have made clear, however, and as
will be reemphasized below, Title VII protects bona fide seniority systems, and it is inappropriate to deny an innocent
employee the benefits of his seniority in order to provide a
remedy in a pattern or practice suit such as this. We thus
have no doubt that the City considered its system to be valid
and that it had no intention of departing from it when it
agreed to the 1980 decree.
Finally, it must be remembered that neither the Union nor
the non-minority employees were parties to tiie Su.it when the
1980
was ent ered. '"Hence the entry of that~ee
cann ot be sal'tt t<r"inaicate any agreement by them to any of
its terms. Absent the presence of the Union or the non-minority employees and an opportunity for them to agree or disagree with any provisions of the decree that might encroach
on their rights, it seems highly unlikely that the City would
purport to bargain away non-minority rights under the then-

aecree

I
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existing seniority system. We therefore conclude that the
injunction does not merely enforce the agreement of the parties as reflected in the consent decree. If the injunction is to
stand, it must be justified on some other basis.
B

The Court of Appeals held that even if the injunction is not
viewed a~pliance with the terms of the decree, it was still properly entered because the District
Court had inherent authority to modify the decree when an
economic crisis unexpec e y reqmre ayo s which, if carried out as the City proposed, would undermine the affirmative action outlined in the decree and impose an undue hardship on respondents. This was true, the court held, even
though the modification conflicted with a bona fide seniority
system adopted by the City. The Court of Appeals erred in
reaching this conclusion.
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice to apply different standards of compensabon~ifteren~Orts",or f)i1vileges or eihplo ent pursuant to a nona fide semorn s stem, provided
that sue I erences are not t e result of an intention to discriminate because of race. 6 It is clear that the City had a
seniority system, that its proposed layoff plan conformed to
that system, and that in making the settlement the City had
not agreed to award competitive seniority to any minority
employee whom the City proposed to lay off. The District
Court held that the City could not follow its seniority system
in making its proposed layoffs because its proposal was discriminatory in effect and hence not a bona fide plan. Section
703(h), however, permits the routine application of a senior6
Section 703 (h) provides that "it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.... " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).
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ity system absent proof of an intention to discriminate.
J .
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977). __.,..-!'
~
Here, the District Court itself found that the layoff proposal
was not adopted with the purpose or intent to discriminate on
the basis of race. Nor had the City in agreeing to the decree
admitted in any way that it had engaged in intentional discrimination. The Court of Appeals was therefore correct in
5lisagreeing with the District Court's holding that the layoff
plan was not a bona fide application of the seniority system,
and it would appear that the City could not be faulted for
following the seniority plan expressed in its agreement with
the Union. The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the
injunction was proper even though it conflicted with the seniority system. This was error.
To support its position, the Court of Appeals first proposed
a "settlement" theory, i. e., that the strong policy favoring
voluntary settlement of Title VII actions permitted consent
decrees that encroached on seniority systems. But at this
stage in its opinion, the Court of ApPeals was supporting the
proposition that even if the injunction was not merely enforcing the agreed-upon terms of the decree, the District Court
had the authority to modify the decree over the objection of
one of the parties. The settlement theory, whatever its
merits might otherwise be, has no application when there is
no "settlement" with respect to the disputed issue. Here,
the agreed-upon decree neither awarded competitive seniority to the minority employees nor purported in any way to
depart from the seniority system.
A second ground advanced by the Court of Appeals in support of the conclusion that the injunction could be entered
notwithstanding its conflict with the seniority system was the
assertion that "[i]t would be incongruous to hold that the use
of the preferred means of resolving an employment discrimination action decreases the power of a court to order relief which vindicates the policies embodied within Title VII,
and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983." 679 F. 2d, at 566. The
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court concluded that if the allegations in the complaint had
been proved, the District Court could have entered an order
overriding the seniority provisions. Therefore, the court
reasoned, "[t]he trial court had the authority to override the
Firefighter's Union seniority provisions to effectuate the purpose of the 1980 Decree." 679 F. 2d, at 566.
The difficulty with this approach is that it overstates the \
authority of the trial court to disregard a seniority system in
fashioning a remedy after a plaintiff has successfully proved
that an employer has followed a pattern or practice having a
discriminatory effect on black applicants or employees. If
individual members of a plaintiff class demonstrate that they
have been actual victims of the discriminatory practice, they
may be awarded competitive seniority and given their rightful place on the seniority roster. This much is clear from
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 947 (1976)
an
sters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977).
eamst~, however, also made clear tha!_mere m~mb~ship
.
lSadvantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seruority award; eacli" inchvfiiuar mU'st provetna"t Ore o1sc:fiiiiliiatory
practice had an ImQact on hlm. 431 0. S., at~ This
conclusiOn impieiilents § 706(g) of Title VII, which prohibits
a court from ordering the reinstatement or promotion of an
individual who has not shown that he has been the victim of
illegal discrimination. 7 Thus, while a court in a Title VII action is empowered to "effect restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring,"
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764
(1976), Congress made clear that "[n]o court order can re-

I

7
Section 706(g) provides that "[n]o order of the court shall require the
admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 704(a)." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e--5(g).
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quire hiring, reinstatement, admission to membership, or
payment of back pay for anyone who was not discriminated
against in violation of [Title VII]." 110 Cong. Rec. 7214
(1964). 8 Even when an individual shows that the discriminatory practice has had an impact on him, he is not automatically entitled to have a non-minority employee laid off to
make room for him. He may have to wait until a vacancy
occurs, 9 and if there are non-minority employees on layoff,
the Court must balance the equities in determining who is entitled to the job. Teamsters, supra, 431 U. S., at 371-376.
See also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 236-240
(1982). Here, there was no finding that any of the blacks
protected from layoff had been a victim of discrimination and
no award of competitive seniority to any of them. Nor had
the parties in formulating the consent decree purported to
identify any specific employee entitled to particular relief
other than those listed in the exhibits attached to the decree.
It therefore seems to us that the Court of Appeals imposed
on the parties as an adjunct of settlement something that
could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and
the plaintiffs prevailed. This holding plainly ignores
8
The quoted portion of the Congressional Record is from a interpretive
memorandum entered into the Record by Senators Clark and Case, the bipartisan "captains" of Title VII. We have recognized the authoritative nature of that memorandum. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S.
63, 73 (1982); Teamsters, supra, 431 U. S., at 352. Similar assurances
about the limits on a court's remedial authority under Title VII were provided by supporters of the bill throughout the Senate debate. 110 Cong.
Rec. 6566 (1964); !d., at 6548 (Remarks of Sen. Humphrey); !d., at 6563
(Remarks of Senator Kuchel); !d., at 11847 (Remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
!d., at 14465.
9
Lower courts have uniformly held that relief for actual victims does
not extend to bumping employees previously occupying jobs. See e. g.,
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 267 (CA4 1976); Local
189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F. 2d
980, 988 (CA5 1969).

I
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§§ 703(h) and 706(g). 10

Finally, the Court of Appeals was of the view that the District Court ordered no more than that which the City unilaterally could have done by way of adopting an affirmative action program. Whether the City, a public employer, could
have taken this course without violating the law is an issue
we need not decide. The fact is that in this case the City
took no such action and that the modification of the decree
was imposed over its objection. 11
We thus are unable to agree either that the preliminary injunction was a justifiable effort to enforce the terms of the
decree to which the City had agreed or that it was a legitimate modification of the decree that could be imposed on the
City without its consent. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.

Neither does it suffice to rely on the District Court's remedial authority under §§ 1981 and 1983. Under those sections relief is authorized only
when there is proof or admission of intentional discrimination. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976); General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375 (1982). Neither precondition was satisfied here.
11
The Court of Appeals also suggested that under United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114-115 (1932), the decree properly was modified
pursuant to the District Court's equity jurisdiction. But Swift cannot be
read as authorizing a court to impose a modification of a decree that runs
counter to statutory policy, here §§ 703(h) and 706(g) of Title VII.
10

..

.

.in.vrtmt Qfltllri oJ t4t ~ttittb jtzdt.tr

JluJrittgton. ~. Of.

21l~l!~

CHAMBERS Of'

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

January 4, 1984

No. 82-206
No. 82-229

Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts
Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts

Dear Byron,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice White

•
Copies to the Conference

'

.

~uvumc

/

(!Jonrt ctf tqt ~niub .§tatcs

2lUas !p:n:{lhm. ~ . <q.

20c?JI. .;l

CHAMBE:RS OF"

January 4, 1984

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 82-206 - Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts
No. 82-229 - Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts
Dear Byron:
I shall
course .

be

circulating

a

dissent

in

this

case

in

due

Sincerely,

Justice White
cc: The Conference

'

'

'

...

'

January 5, 1.984

82-206 Firefighters Local v. Stotts

Dear Byron:

Please join mP..
Sinc~rely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

't

The Conference

.ilt.p:ftlttt

Qf01trl ttf tlft ~tb .Stait•

'cJ*Z«Jqingfctt. ~. QJ:. 2ilgt~~
CHAMBER S Of"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 5, 1984
Re:

No. 82-206) Firefighters Local Union No. 1784. v.
) Stotts
82-229) Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

•

··
'

.

.

i'Ulfrtntt <!fttUri 4tf tlft ~~ ,i\hdtg
~-.lfinghtn. ~.

Of.

2.0.;i,.~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 5, 1984

Re:

83-206; 82-229 - Firefighters Local
v. Stotts

Dear Byron:
Although I expect to JOln the judgment, I will
probably write separately and may wait to see what
Harry has to say.
Respectfully,

(J/l_
I

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

.iu:prtutt <!fond of tqt ~t~ .itatts
WasJringhtn. ~. <!f. 2ll,?.l!~
CHAMBERS OF'

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 5, · 1984

Re:

Nos. 82-206 and 229-Firefighters Local. Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts and Memphis Fire Dept. v."
Stotts

Dear Byron:
I

await the dissent.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

.

.Bu.p:rmu Clf&nttt Df tJrt ~a .Statts
._,..lfi:nght~ ~.

Of.

20p,.~

CHAMI!IERS Of'

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

January 31, 1984

Re:

(82-206 - Firefighters Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, et al.
(

(82-229 - Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts, et al.

Dear Byron:
I join.
Regards,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

Y~b

~

e'\11.

""~
-T \ ' l ~
-\- .
~~~ QJ~

()1.
0

\

~.

. ~ \l

.

\0

~ TI

_\

~

f\

~

_

~ ~~ \N~\. ~ ~ ~
_

':

~~~~ '

•

\\

~Q....N t.A. ~
'\ ,

' ,'. _ .\- .

~~
Q..,

"

,

•

~ ~~~ \\J ~~ ~~~C

~,

The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
JusticeRehnquist
Justice Stevens

~ JusticeO'Con~or

~~. . ~ ~~ ~ ~ a.~~ 1\~rom: Justice Blackmun

c..\ ~ ~~~~-\~ ~~ ~ \
" )

· ~ ~ · ~-- ~

~

'-.)

\H-. ~

61

Circulated:
MAR 2 1984
Recirculated: _ _ __ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

H

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS .

82-206

AND

!jfo /)-- ~

82-229

FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1784,
PETITIONER

/.

v.

82-206

CARL W. STOTTS

ET AL.

MEMPHIS FIRE DEPARTMENT, ET
PETITIONERS
v.
82-229
CARL w. STOTTS, ETC.' ET AL.

AL.,

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[March-, 1984]

dissenting.
Today's opinion is troubling less for the law it creates than
for the law it ignores. The Court rejects respondents' claim
that these cases are moot because the Court concludes there
is a live dispute between the city and the union over backpay
and seniority for union members laid off by the city. The
Court appears to be oblivious, however, to respondents' lack
of adversarial interest in that issue, and to the Article III restriction that limits the jurisdiction of this Court to cases involving adverse parties. Having improperly asserted jurisdiction, the Court then ignores the proper standard of
review. The District Court's action was a preliminary injunction reviewable only on an abuse of discretion standard;
the Court treats the action as a permanent injunction and decides the merits, even though the District Court has not yet
had an opportunity to do so. On the merits, the Court ignores the prior decisions of this Court that make inapplicable
the very provisions of Title VII on which the Court relies.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

Ji¢-
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Because the Court's decision is demonstrably in error, I respectfully dissent.
I

Mootness. "The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review and not simply at the date the action is initiated."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In the absence of a
live controversy, the constitutional requirement of a "case"
or "controversy," see U. S. Const., Art. III, deprives a federal court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, a case, although live
at the start, becomes moot when intervening acts destroy the
interest of a party to the adjudication. DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974). In such a situation, the federal practice is to vacate the judgment and remand the case
with a direction to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear,
Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950).
Application of these principles to the present cases is
straightforward. The controversy underlying the suits is
whether the city of Memphis' proposed layoff plan violated
the 1980 consent decree. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction limiting the proportion of Negroes that
the city could layoff as part of its efforts to solve its fiscal
problems. Because of the injunction, the city chose instead
to reduce its workforce according to a modified layoff plan
under which some whites were laid off despite their greater
seniority than the blacks protected by the preliminary injunction. Since the preliminary injunction was entered, however, the layoffs all have terminated and the city has taken
back every one of the workers laid off pursuant to the modified plan. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction no longer
restrains the city's conduct, and the adverse relationship between the opposing parties is completely gone. A ruling in
this situation thus becomes wholly advisory, and ignores the
basic duty of this Court "'to decide actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
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opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."' Oil Workers v. Missouri,
361 U. S. 363, 367 (1960), quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U. S.
651, 653 (1895). The proper disposition, therefore, is to vacate the judgment and remand the cases with directions to
dismiss them as moot. 1
In its struggle to resurrect a controversy on which to base
its jurisdiction, the Court focuses on the wages and seniority
lost by white employees during the period of their layoffsand it is undisputed that some such pay and seniority were
lost. The Court does not suggest, however, and cannot so
suggest, that its decision today will provide the affected
workers with any backpay or seniority. It is clear that any
such backpay or retroactive seniority for laid-off workers
1
Because the Court finds that the backpay issue keeps these cases alive,
it does not consider whether the controversy is also alive, as petitioners
urge, because it falls into that narrow category of cases that are "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). I need mention that suggestion only
briefly.
Any contention that the issues in this litigation "evade review" is belied
by the facts. The petitions for certiorari were filed on August 4 and 5,
1982. The last demoted Memphis firefighter was restored to his position
in June 1983. Until the demotions ended, the cases remained alive because the preliminary injunction kept blacks employed in positions that the
city otherwise would have filled with whites. In the normal course of
events, a case brought here by a petition filed in August 1982 almost certainly would have been decided during the Court's 1982 Term, prior to the
end of the demotions. The only reason that these cases were not decided
on that schedule is that this Court withheld ruling pending disposition of
Boston Firefighters Union v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, - - U. S. - (1983), which presented a similar issue. Were layoffs identical to those in
these cases to occur again in Memphis, the issue would evade review only if
there were, once again, a reason for this Court to delay consideration of the
issue. It is not realistic to suggest that the likelihood of that scenario is
sufficient to bring these cases into the category of cases kept alive because
by their nature they "evade review."
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would have to come from the city, not from respondents. 2
But both the city and the union are petitioners here, not adversaries, and respondents have no interest in defending the
Court of Appeals' judgment simply to protect the city from
liability to the union in a separate proceeding. For that reason, these suits involve the wrong adverse parties for resolution of any issues of backpay and seniority.
The Court acknowledges, moreover, that neither the preliminary injunction nor the Cop.rt of Appeals' judgment prohibits the city from awarding to the workers affected by the
layoffs whatever backpay and seniority it feels they deserve.
See ante, at 6--7. The city is free to make a voluntary award
of backpay or seniority without a ruling from this Court.
Any award of backpay and seniority that the union will obtain
through adjudication must come in a separate suit against the
city. Thus, today's decision does not provide any relief in
the very controversy on which the Court bases its jurisdiction-a tell-tale sign of an advisory opinion.
The Court, nevertheless, suggests that the backpay and
seniority issues somehow keep these cases alive despite the
absence of an adversarial party. 3 The Court states:
In the event that the laid off firefighters were to bring a successful action for backpay against the city, the city would have no claim for reimbursement against respondents for securing an allegedly erroneous injunction. No bond was posted for the preliminary injunction, and "[a]
party injured by the issuance of an injunction later determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence of a bond." W . R. Grace &
Co. v. Local Union 759, - - U. S. - - , - - , n. 14 (1983).
3
Today's decision, of course, disposes of two cases-one brought here
by the city and others, and the second by the union-that were consolidated below. The Court's conclusion that the backpay and seniority issues
keep the controversy live, however, presumably applies only to the suit between respondents and the union because its premise is that the city will
assert the validity of the preliminary injunction as a defense in a backpay
claim brought by the union against the city. If the city would defend the
validity of the preliminary injunction in a backpay suit, such a suit presumably cannot keep alive the attack on the validity of the preliminary injunction in this proceeding. At a minimum, therefore, the Court must concede
2
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"Unless the Court of Appeals' judgment is set aside, the
layoffs and demotions of the white employees were in accordance with law. It would be quite unreasonable to
expect the city to pay out money to which the employees
have no legal claim or to take some other action enhancing the relative position of the affected employees in the
work force except pursuant to some claim of right."
Ante, at 6--7.
Although the artful ambiguity of this passage renders it capable of two interpretations, neither provides a basis on
which to conclude that these cases are not moot. The Court
may mean to suggest that the city has no legal obligation to
provide backpay and retroactive seniority, but that it might
voluntarily do so if this Court opines that the preliminary injunction was improper. A decision in that situation, however, would be an advisory opinion in the fullest sense-it
would not require the city to do anything. One must assume
that the Court has something else in mind, because it gives
no indication that it no longer feels constrained by the Article
III prohibition on rendering advisory opinions that has been
recognized in the federal ·courts for almost 200 years. See
Rayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), as interpreted in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 351-353 (1911).
It is more likely that the Court means to suggest that if the
Court of Appeals' judgment is left standing, it would have
some kind of preclusive effect in a subsequent suit for back
pay and retroactive seniority brought by the union against
the city. Even assuming arguendo that the Court is correct-which it is not 4-its point is manifestly irrelevant to
that the controversy between the city and respondents, No. 82-229, is
moot.
' I am at somewhat of a loss trying to understand the Court's suggestion
that the District Court's preliminary injunction prevented contract liability
from arising between the city and the affected white employees. As is explained more fully, infra, the preliminary injunction did not require the
city to layoff anyone. The preliminary injunction merely prohibited the
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the mootness issue. As mentioned above, this Court's longstanding treatment of cases that are moot is to vacate the
judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss. 5 This
practice arose in response to precisely the concern that the
Court now expresses over the effect of the Court of Appeals'
judgment in these cases. As explained in Munsingwear,
supra:
"The established practice of the Court in dealing with a
civil case from a court in the federal system which has
become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment
below and remand with a direction to dismiss. That was
said in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S.
259, 267, to be 'the duty of the appellate court.' That
procedure clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.
When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties
are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in
the statutory scheme was only preliminary." 340
U. S., at 39 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Until today, therefore, it has been the rule that a case
pending here is not kept alive because it contains issues that
city from laying off more than a certain proportion of blacks. In the face of
that constraint, the city decided to proceed with layoffs and to lay off
whites instead of the protected blacks. If in so doing the city breached
contractual rights of the white employees, those rights remained enforceable. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, supra (employer could
be held liable for breach of collective bargaining agreement when, because
women employees were protected by an injunction, it laid off male employees with greater seniority).
5
The Court has followed this practice for at least 90 years. See New
Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 161 U. S. 101, 103 (1896), modifying
160 U.S. 170 (1895). See also Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442
U. S. 92 (1979); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395 (1975); Parker v. Ellis,
362 U. S. 574 (1960); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259,
267 (1936).

·,.
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may arise in a different proceeding in another forum. Such
issues simply are irrelevant to the mootness question, which
focuses on the adversariness of the opposing parties on the
issue before the Court. In Oil Workers v. Missouri, supra,
for example, the Court declined to review an expired
antistrike injunction issued pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, even though the challenged statute
also governed a monetary penalty claim pending in state
court against the union. The Court stated: "'[T]hat suit is
not before us. We have not now jurisdiction of it or its issues. Our power only extends over and is limited by the
conditions of the case now before us"' (emphasis added). 361
U. S., at 370, quoting American Book Co. v. Kansas, 193
U. S. 49, 52 (1904). The Court today simply has its reasoning backwards. It believes that these cases present a live
controversy because the judgment will control future litigation unless "set aside," ante, at 6; yet the chief consequence
of a determination of mootness would be to "set aside" that
judgment.
By going beyond the reach of its Article III powers, today's decision exhibits all the characteristics of an advisory
opinion. The Court concedes that there is considerable
doubt whether, in fact, the union possesses any enforceable
contractual rights. 6 It also is unclear how the propriety of
6

It appears that if the union enjoys any contractual rights at all, they
derive from the "Memorandum of Understanding" between the union and
the city, which indicates that layoffs shall be made on the basis of seniority.
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-206, p. A81. The Tennessee Supreme
Court recently has confirmed, however, that the Memorandum of Understanding confers no enforceable rights, Fulenwider v. Firefighters Association Local Union 1784, 649 S. W. 2d 268 (1982), because of state law limits on the authority of municipalities to contract with labor organizations.
Thus, the likely reason that the union has not filed a suit for backpay is
because it has no enforceable rights.
The likelihood that there are no such rights provides some explanation
for the otherwise curious posture of the city in these cases. If the validity
of the preliminary injunction somehow affects the backpay issue, one would
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the preliminary injunction would affect the city's defenses to
a contract claim by the union. 7 In any event, no such claim
has been filed. The Court thus provides an advisory opinion
for the union on the theory that it might affect a defense that
the city has not asserted, in a suit that the union has not
brought, to enforce contractual rights that may not exist. 8
expect that the city would try to minimize its liability for backpay by arguing that the injunction was valid. The city's position makes perfect sense,
however, if one assumes that the union has no enforceable rights, and that
the city would be seeking only an advisory opinion on the interpretation of
the consent decree. Such an opinion, however, is precisely what this
Court always has stated it cannot give.
7
An enjoined party is required to obey an injunction issued by a federal
court within its jurisdiction even if the injunction turns out on review to
have been erroneous.
"'An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction ...
served upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must
be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be, even
if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law
going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its
orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them
is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished."' Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307, 314 (1967), quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258
u. s. 181, 189-190 (1922).
Given that the city could have been punished for contempt if it had disregarded the preliminary injunction, regardless of whether the injunction on
appeal were found erroneous, it seems unlikely that a defense to a breach
of contract would turn on whether the preliminary injunction is upheld on
appeal as opposed to the city's obligation to obey the injunction when
entered.
8
The Court's statement that respondents' mootness argument "ignores
the reality of the situation," ante, at 6, is ironic in view of the Court's reliance on an identical argument last Term in Boston Firefighters Union v.
Boston Chapter, NAACP, supra. That case concerned layoffs by the Boston Police and Fire Departments that would have vitiated much of the
progress made under consent decrees, the purpose of which was to increase minority representation in those Departments. A District Court
order modified the consent decrees, and enjoined the city from reducing
minority percentages in its workforce. As a consequence, Boston chose to
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II
A

Assuming arguendo that these cases are justiciable because of unresolved backpay issues, then the only question
before the Court is the validity of a preliminary injunction
that prevented the city from conducting layoffs that would
have reduced the number of blacks in certain job categories
within the Memphis Fire Department. In granting such relief, the District Court was required to consider respondents'
likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of irreparable
harm to the parties, and whether the injunction would be in
the public interest. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451
U. S. 390, 392 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S.
922, 931 (1975). The question before a reviewing court "is
simply whether the issuance of the injunction, in light of the
applicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion."
!d., at 932.
layoff white employees in violation of the white employees' rights to he laid
off on a last-hired-first-fired basis. As in this case, the laid-off white employees suffered lost wages during the period of their layoffs. Before this
Court decided the case, however, the layoffs ended and all affected employees returned to their jobs. Apparently recognizing that the backpay issue
could not keep alive the dispute over the validity of the District Court's
injunction, this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of mootness. The Court offers no sensible explanation for
treating the mootness issue in this case differently. The contrasting treatment is especially surprising given that in Boston Firefighters the affected
employees actually had filed backpay claims, whereas in this case any such
claim remains hypothetical.
The Court's feeble attempt to distinguish the two cases rests on the
ground that an intervening statute may have affected the issues in Boston
Firefighters. See ante, at 6, n. 3. But that statute affected only the likelihood of a similar layoff in the future. Its relevance was therefore restricted to the question whether the Boston layoffs were "capable of repetition yet evading review." The intervening statute had nothing to do
with the backpay issue, and a remand would not have been necessary had
the backpay issue alone been sufficient to keep the controversy alive.
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The Court, however, has chosen to answer a different
question. The Court's opinion does not mention the standard of review for a preliminary injunction, and does not apply
that standard to these cases. Instead, the Court treats the
cases as if they involved a permanent injunction, and addresses the question whether the city's proposed layoffs violated the consent decree. That issue was never resolved in
the District Court because the city did not press for a final
decision on the merits. The issue, therefore, is not properly
before this Court. Mter taking jurisdiction over a controversy that no longer is, the Court reviews a decision that
never was.
In so doing, the Court does precisely what in Camenisch,
supra, it unanimously concluded was error. Camenisch involved a suit by a deaf student who claimed that the University of Texas unlawfully had refused to pay for an interpreter
to assist him in his studies. Finding a possibility that
Camenisch would suffer irreparable harm and that he was
likely to prevail on the merits, the District Court granted a
preliminary injunction requiring the University to provide an
interpreter pending the outcome of the litigation and requiring Camenisch to post a bond. While appeal of the preliminary injunction was pending before the Court of Appeals,
Camenisch graduated. In affirming the District Court's preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals had rejected
Camenisch's suggestion that his graduation rendered the
case moot; there remained the issue whether the University
or Camenisch should pay the interpreter. This Court
granted certiorari and vacated and remanded the case to the
District Court. The Court explained:
"The Court of Appeals correctly held that the case as a
whole is not moot, since, as that Court noted, it remains
to be decided who should ultimately bear the cost of the
interpreter. However, the issue before the Court of Appeals was not who should pay for the interpreter, but
rather whether the District Court had abused its discre-
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tion in issuing a preliminary injunction requiring the
University to pay for him. . . . The two issues are significantly different, since whether the preliminary injunction should have issued depended on the balance of
factors [for granting preliminary injunctions], while
whether the University should ultimately bear the cost of
the interpreter depends on a final resolution of the merits of Camenisch's case.
In sum, the question whether a preliminary injunction
should have been issued here is moot, because the terms
of the injunction, as modified by the Court of Appeals,
have been fully and irrevocably carried out. The question whether the University must pay for the interpreter
remains for the trial on the merits. Until such a trial
has taken place, it would be inappropriate for this Court
to intimate any view on the merits of the lawsuit" (emphasis added). 451 U. S., at 393, 398.
The case "as a whole" remained live in Camenisch because
the parties before the Court remained adverse on the issue to
be resolved at trial; as demonstrated in Part I, supra, such
adversariness does not exist in this case on the issues of seniority and backpay.
Putting that difference aside,
Camenisch confirms that the Court has misunderstood the
issue now before it in two other respects. First, Camenisch
makes clear that even if the union's interest in backpay gave
rise to a continuing controversy, the appropriate disposition
is a remand for a determination on the merits. The question
before the Court of Appeals was whether the District Court
had properly considered the factors relevant to granting a
preliminary injunction; that question became moot when the
layoffs ended, just as the propriety of the preliminary injunction in Camenisch became moot when Camenisch graduated.
The backpay dispute between the union and the city in these
cases, like the dispute over who was to pay for the interpreter in Camenisch, depends not on the propriety of the
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preliminary injunction, but on an ultimate resolution of the
merits-here, whether the proposed layoffs violated the consent decree. That question never was decided by the District Court and would require a trial on the merits.
Second, Camenisch demonstrates that a determination of a
party's entitlement to a preliminary injunction is a separate
issue from the determination of the merits of the party's underlying legal claim. Even if petitioners' challenge to the
preliminary injunction were not moot, the only issue before
this Court would be the propriety of preliminary injunctive
relief. See, also, New York State Liquor Authority v.
Bellanca, 452 U. S. 714, 716 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U. S., at 931-932, 934. The Court has chosen to
answer a different question when it reaches the merits of respondents' claim, a question that simply is not presented by
the cases in their present posture. It is true, of course, that
the District Court and the Court of Appeals had to make a
preliminary evaluation of respondents' likelihood of success
on the merits, but that evaluation provides no basis for deciding the merits:
"Since Camenisch's likelihood of success on the merits
was one of the factors the District Court and the Court of
Appeals considered in granting Camenisch a preliminary
injunction, it might be suggested that their decisions
were tantamount to decisions on the underlying merits
and thus that the preliminary-injunction issue is not
truly moot. . . . This reasoning fails, however, because
it improperly equates 'likelihood of success' with 'success,' and what is more important, because it ignores the
significant procedural differences between preliminary
and permanent injunctions" (emphasis added). 451
U. S., at 394.
Indeed, there simply is no proper factual basis on which
this Court legitimately can decide the question whether the

82-206 & 82-229--DISSENT
FIREFIGHTERS v. STOTTS

13

city's proposed layoffs violated the consent decree. 9 Like
the proceedings in Camenisch, the proceedings in this litigation "bear the marks of the haste characteristic of a request
for a preliminary injunction." I d., at 398. The hearing on
the preliminary injunction was held four days after the layoffs had been announced. With the exception of a single
deposition held the day before the hearing, there was no discovery. In opening the hearing, the trial judge noted: "One
of the problems with these injunction hearings centers
around the fact that the lawyers don't have the usual time to
develop the issues, and take discovery, and exchange information, and to call on each other to state what they think
the issues are . .. I got an idea from the lawyers-! am not
sure that they were finally decided on what route they were
going.... " App. 30. It is true that the District Court
made a few of what generously could be described as findings
and conclusions, but, as the Court in Camenisch pointed out,
"findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the
merits." 451 U. S., at 395.
I realize that, because the adverse parties on the backpay
and seniority issues are the city and the union, further proceedings between the city and respondents would be a mockery of Article III's case or controversy requirement. The
prospect of such a charade, however, only points out why
these cases are the wrong ones in which to resolve the issue
of backpay. Instead of promoting a tennis match with the
players on the same side of the net, the Court should vacate
""'the-judgment in these cases and remand them with an instructiOn to dismiss. If the union wis hes to seek backpay in
a suit against the city, it can do so in a proceeding in which
the parties are adverse. Such a proceeding would be fully
competent to interpret the consent decree for the purpose of
9

The facts relevant to these cases certainly are not uncontested.
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determining what effect, if any, the consent decree has on the
city's contractual obligations to the union.
B

Even on its own terms, the Court's analysis of the District
Court's preliminary injunction is flawed. The Court's initial
error lies in its belief that the "issue at the heart of this case"
is the District Court's power to "enter[] an injunction requiring white employees to be laid off." Ante, at 7. On its face,
the preliminary injunction prohibited the city from conducting layoffs in accordance with its seniority system "insofar as
it will decrease the percentage of blacks" in certain job categories within the Fire Department. App. to Pet . .for Cert.
in No. 82-229, p. A80. The preliminary injunction did not
require the city to lay off any white employees at all. Although the District Court restricted the city's options in
meeting its fiscal crisis, it did not require that the city dismiss white employees on pain of contempt. This distinction
is critical because, by requiring only that the city's layoffs not
..\. ~
affect more than a certain proportion of blacks, the District
o.__' ~ ~ Court did not abrogate the contractual rights of white em~ ' ~ fQ.~ployees. The decision to have layoffs instead of meeting its
~
Q.
fiscal problems in a different manner remained the choice of
the city; if the modified layoff plan abrogated the contractual
rights of the union, those rights remained enforceable. 10
That a union's contractual rights could remain enforceable
despite the preliminary injunction was the unanimous teaching of this Court just last Term in W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local

tJ

Judge Martin's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part from
the Sixth Circuit's decision is based on precisely this point:
"I must conclude that the District Court has no authority to abrogate the
Union's contractual and statutory rights. The Union was not a party to
this suit when the consent decree was entered. Judge McRae simply enjoined the City from making its proposed layoffs in the Fire Department.
Judge McRae's actions do not affect the collectively bargained rights of the
Union" (emphasis added). 679 F. 2d 541, 569 (1982).
10
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Union 759, - - U. S. - - (1983), which presented a situation remarkably similar to this case. In that case, an employer concluded that its financial condition necessitated layoffs. Its female employees were protected by a court order
issued pursuant to a consent decree, while its male employees had seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement. The employer decided to lay off males. The affected
males obtained awards in grievance proceedings for the
breach of their collectively bargained rights, which the employer insisted were unenforceable because of the District
Court order. This Court made clear that the dilemma faced
by the employer did not render the male employees' contractual rights unenforceable:
"Given the Company's desire to reduce its workforce,
it is undeniable that the Company was faced with a dilemma: it could follow the conciliation agreement as mandated by the District Court and risk liability under the
collective bargaining agreement, or it could follow the
bargaining agreement and risk both a contempt citation
and Title VII liability. The dilemma, however, was of
the Company's own making. The Company committed
itself voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obligations." I d., at - - .
It is clear, therefore, that the correctness of the District
Court's interpretation of the decree is irrelevant with respect
to the enforceability of the union's contractual rights; those
rights remained enforceable regardless of whether the city
had an obligation not to lay off blacks. 11 Despite the Court's
11

To bolster the impression that the District Court required the layoff of
whites, the Court speciously focuses on the fact that the District Court "approved" the city's modified layoff plan under which whites were laid off.
Ante, at 6. District court approval of the modified plan, as the Court presumably knows, has no effect whatsoever on the enforceability of the rights
of affected white employees. The injunction stated that the defendants
"should file a proposed plan to comply with this Court's injunction." App.
to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-229, p. A79. The city was free to propose any

82-206 & 82-229---DISSENT

16

FIREFIGHTERS v. STOTTS

efforts, the guestion in these cases remains whether the DisJ.rict Court's authority pursuant to the consent decree en-:abled it to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the layoff

c
In affirming the District Court's preliminary injunction,
the Court of Appeals suggested at least two grounds on
which respondents might have prevailed on the merits. The
first of these derives from the contractual characteristics of a
consent decree. Because a consent decree "is to be construed for enforcement purposes essentially as a contract,"
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223,
238 (1975), respondents had the right to specific performance
of the terms of the decree.
If the proposed layoffs violated
the terms of the decree, the District Court could issue an injunction requiring compliance with those terms. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals noted that a court of equity has
inherent power to modify a consent decree in light of changed
circumstances. 679 F. 2d 541, 560-561 (1982). Thus, if respondents could show that changed circumstances justified
modification of the decree, the District Court would have authority to make such a change. The Court fails to address
either of these grounds in a satisfactory way.
1

The District Court's authority to enforce the terms and
purposes of the consent decree was expressly reserved in the
plan at all, so long as it did not have the prohibited effect of reducing black
representation in protected job categories. When the court approved the
proposed plan, it stated merely that the "proposed plan for conducting the
contemplated layoffs is in accordance with the preliminary injunction issued May 8, and is therefore approved." I d., at A83. It is simply incorrect for this Court to pretend that the District Court's approval of the
city's modified plan somehow transformed the preliminary injunction from
one that prohibited the layoff of blacks into one that first required the layoff of whites and then immunized the city for any liability that it otherwise
would incur for such layoffs.
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decree itself. Paragraph 17 of the decree stated: "The Court
retains jurisdiction of this action for such further orders as
may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes
of this decree." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-229, p.
A69. It was that provision under which the respondents
sought the preliminary injunction. See Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of a Preliminary Injunction,
p. 1. The decree obligated the city to provide certain specific relief to particular individuals, and to pursue a long term
goal to "raise the black representation in each job classification on the fire department to levels approximating the black
proportion of the civilian labor force in Shelby County."
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-229, p. A64. The decree set
more specific goals for hiring and promotion opportunities as
well. To meet these goals, the decree "require[d] reasonable, good faith efforts on the part of the City." Ibid.
In support of their request for a preliminary injunction, respondents claimed that the proposed layoffs would adversely
affect blacks significantly out of proportion to their representation. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of a Preliminary Injunction, pp. 1-2. They argued that the proposed
layoffs were "designed to thwart gains made by blacks"
under the decree. I d., at 2. Their argument emphasized
that the Mayor had "absolute discretion to choose which job
classifications" were to be affected by the layoffs, ibid., and
that the "ranks chosen by the Mayor for demotion are those
where blacks are represented in the greatest number." Id.,
at 4. Respondents claimed that such a layoff plan "violates
the spirit of the 1980 Consent Decree." I d., at 3. On the
basis of these claims and the limited evidence presented at
the hearing prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the District Court enjoined the city from laying off
blacks where the effect would have been to reduce the percentage of black representation in certain job categories.
The purpose of the injunction was not to announce the District Court's final interpretation of the consent decree. Nor
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did it embody a conclusion that the proposed layoff plan violated the decree. As this Court has explained before, the
purpose of a preliminary injunction is much more limited:
"The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to
preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial
on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose,
and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less
formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial
on the merits . . . In light of these considerations, it is
generally inappropriate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the
merits." University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.,
at 395 .
.The Court's opinion does not even suggest that the District
Court abused its discretion in concludin that the relative oSI Ions o e c1 y an respondents needed to be preserved,
pending further proceedm s b means of a relimmary mjunc IOn. n ee , the Court does not address the ques IOn
at all. The Court concludes, instead, that the proposed layoffs would not have violated the consent decree-an issue on
which neither party has had the opportunity to gather and
adduce its full evidence. Until that opportunity has been
given, this Court can only speculate about whether, for example, discovery would have produced evidence to show that
the layoffs violated the city's obligation of good faith under
the decree.
2

The Court also fails properly to address the question
whether respondents might have shown that the city's fiscal
crisis justified a modification of the consent decree. This
Court frequently has recognized the inherent "power of a
court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to
changed conditions though it was entered by consent."
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932); ac-

••
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cord, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427
U. S. 424, 437 (1976); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U. S. 244, 251 (1968); Chrysler Corp. v.
United States, 316 U. S. 556, 562 (1942). "The source of tlle
power to modify is of course the fact that an injunction often
requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief." System Federation v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 647
(1961). The test for ruling on a plaintiff's request for a modification of a consent decree is "whether the change serve[s] to
effectuate . . . the basic purpose of the original consent decree." Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S., at 562. 12
Thus, even if respondents could not show that the layoffs
were "designed to thwart the gains made by blacks" under
the decree, or that they "violate[d) the spirit" of the consent
decree, respondents might have shown that the need for layoffs represented an unanticipated "changed circumstance"
Petitioners' and the Court's heavy reliance on United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971), is misplaced. In that case, the Court
held that a court should not give a consent decree an interpretation that its
language cannot sustain even if that interpretation would further the purposes of one of the parties to the decree. The Court, however, did not
hold that a modification of a consent decree would not be appropriate if the
purposes of the decree were being frustrated. On the contrary, the Court
explicitly stated that frustration of purpose "might be a persuasive argument for modifying the original decree, after full litigation, on a claim that
unforeseen circumstances now made additional relief desirable to prevent
the evils aimed at by the original complaint. Here, however, where we
deal with the construction of an existing consent decree, such an argument
is out of place." !d., at 681 (footnote omitted). Since Armour, this Court
has confirmed that its holding in that case indicates only that while "modification could be had after a proper hearing proving the need for such modification under applicable standards, it would not sanction such modification
in the guise of construing a consent decree." United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223, 236, n. 9 (1975). It is clear, therefore,
that Armour has no application for determining whether modification of a
consent decree is appropriate.
12
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that would frustrate the purpose of the decree. In any
event, respondents have not yet had the opportunity to do so
.
· . \except at the preliminary injunction stage. In deciding to
b ~ . . . . . .~~
preserve the status quo, the District Judge was in a particu~ ~ ~larly strong positioli10'e\raluate the likelihood of respondents'
~ \l
-l
success on the merits; he was the same judge that originally
- ~ \ .I'- ~ issued the decree. That perspective made him especially fa~
miliar with the "circumstances surrounding the formation of
~· ~\'"-1\~ ~ the consent order," United States v. ITT Continental Baking
· ~ · ,- ~ 4-:,
Co., 420 U. S. 223, 238 (1975), and uniquely suited to evalu• 'I...D ~
ate-upon the necessarily limited information available at
that early stage of the proceedings-whether respondents
would be likely to prove that they were entitled to a modification. Once again, however, because the propriety of the preliminary injunction is moot, I see no reason to speculate on
whether respondents might ultimately have made the necessary showing.
III

"""-

Y.

As the preceding discussion has made clear, respondents
based their request for a preliminary injunction on the District Court's authority to supervise the consent decree between the city and respondents. Their argument in support
of the request was grounded exclusively in the terms of that
decree. The request was not based on an allegation that the
city's proposed layoffs violated Title VII. Accordingly, the
propriety of the preliminary injunction is properly determined exclusively by reference to the authority conferred
upon the District Court by the consent decree.
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis of these cases focuses
on Title VII. The Court concludes that the preliminary injunction was improper because it "imposed on the parties as
an adjunct of settlement something that could not have been
ordered had the case gone to trial and the plaintiffs prevailed." Ante, at 13. Thus, the Court has chosen to evaluate the propriety of the preliminary injunction by asking
what type of relief the District Court could have awarded had
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respondents litigated their Title VII claim and prevailed on
the merits. Although it is far from clear whether that is the
right question, 13 it is demonstrably clear that the Court has
given the wrong answer.
The Court's analysis of this issue seems to me to be chaotic.
Had respondents prevailed on their Title VII claims at trial,
the remedies available would have been those provided by
§ 706(g), 42 U. S. C. § 2000E-5(g). Under that section, a
court that determines that an employer has violated Title VII
may "enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate" (emphasis added). The scope of the relief that
could have been entered on behalf of respondents had they
prevailed at trial therefore depends on the nature of relief
that is "appropriate" in remedying Title VII violations.
The Court obfuscates its inquiry into this question by focusing on§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000E-2(h). Section 703 defines the substantive elements of a Title VII violation. Sub18
The Court's analysis seems to be premised on the view that a consent
decree cannot provide relief that could not be obtained at trial. In addressing the Court's analysis, I do not mean to imply that I accept its
premise as correct. In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), this
Court considered whether an affirmative action plan adopted voluntarily
by an employer violated Title VII because it discriminated against whites.
In holding that the plan was lawful, the Court stressed that the voluntariness of the plan informed the nature of its inquiry. I d., at 200; see also id.,
at 211 (concurring opinion). Because a consent decree is an agreement
that is enforceable in court, it has qualities of both voluntariness and compulsion. This Court has explained that Congress intended to encourage
voluntary settlement of Title VII suits, Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
450 U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), and cooperative private efforts to eliminate
the lingering effects of past discrimination. Weber, 432 U. S., at 201-207.
It is by no means clear, therefore, that the permissible scope of relief available under a consent decree is the same as could be ordered by a court after
a finding of liability at trial.
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section (h) is merely a limitation of the broad definition of
what constitutes an unlawful employment practice. As the
Court notes, § 703(h) "provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, provided that
such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race." Ante, at 10. Thus, subsection (h)
simply makes clear that application of a bona fide seniority (·
system will not in itself constitute unlawful disc:rffilinatwn. 1
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 t.J. S. 747
(1976). Prior cases of this Court make clear, however, that
§ 703(h) has nothing to do with the type of remedies that are
appropriate once unlawful discrimination has been found.
The Court in Franks said:
"On its face, § 703(h) appears to b~ only a definitional
provision; as with the other provisions of § 703, subsection (h) delineates which employment practices are illegal and thereby prohibited and which are not. Section
703(h) certainly does not expressly purport to qualify or
proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under the remedial provisions of Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U. S. C.
§2000e-5(g), in circumstances where an illegal
dscriminatory practice is found. Further, the legislative history of § 703(h) plainly negates its reading as
limiting or qualifying the relief authorized under
§ 706(g)" (emphasis added and footnote omitted). I d.,
at 758-759.
See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352
(1977) ("the unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) was to make
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII").
Had respondents' Title VII suit gone to trial and had respondents claimed that the city's seniority system violated
Title VII, then § 703(h) would have been relevant at the liability stage of the trial. Alternatively, had respondents
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sought the preliminary injunction on the ground that application of the seniority system violated Title VII, then § 703(h)
would have been relevant in evaluating whether respondents
were likely to succeed on the merits. But neither of these
situations is present in these cases. The Court has assumed
for purposes of its analysis that respondents would have prevailed at the liability stage of their Title VII suit, and
Franks makes clear that § 703(h) would have been irrelevant
in determining appropriate relief. Similarly, as I have
noted, respondents did not seek their preliminary injunction
on the ground that the city's seniority system was not bona
fide and that it violated Title VII; they sought the injunction
based on the terms of the consent decree. Section 703(h) is
therefore irrelevant in evaluatin whether res ondents ·
wou d have prevailed in oht.ainin2" permanent injunctive relief. The city's and the union's claims that the seniority sys"'::
tern is bona fide are entirely beside the point; unfortunately,
the Court has missed the point as well.
In determining the nature of "appropriate" relief under
§ 706(g), courts have distinguished between individual relief
and race-conscious class relief. Although overlooked by the
Court, this distinction is highly relevant here. In a Title VII
class-action suit of the type brought by respondents, an individual is entitled to an individual award of relief only if he can
establish that he was the victim of discrimination. That requirement grows out of the general equitable principles of
"make whole" relief; 14 an individual who has suffered no injury is not entitled to an individual award. See Teamsters,
431 U. S., at 347--348, 364--371. If victimization is shown,
however, an individual is entitled to whatever retroactive se14
The Court's opinion seems to imply that the victimization requirement
implemented in Teamsters derives from the last sentence of § 706(g).
Teamsters does not mention that provision, and, as is explained below, the
provision is not a victimization requirement. The victimization requirement simply derives from the principles implicit in the make-whole objective of individual relief.

~ :s.\-.~ ~
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niority, backpay, and promotions are consistent with the
statute's goal of making the victim whole. Franks, 424
U. S., at 762-770.
In a class action suit under Title VII, the Courts of Appeals
are unanimously of the view that race-conscious affirmative
relief is also "appropriate" under § 706(g). 15 See University
of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 301-302 (opinion of POWELL, J.), 353, n. 28 (1978) (opinion of BRENNAN,
WHITE, MARSHALL AND BLACKMUN, JJ.). The purpose of
16

See e. g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F . 2d 1017,
1027-1028 (CAl 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F. 2d 622, 629 (CA2 1974);
E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. 2d 167, 174-177 (CA31977),
cert. denied, 438 U. S. 915 (1978); Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F. 2d 482, 499 (CA41981); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614
F. 2d 1358, 1363-1366 (CA5 1980); United States v. I.B.E.W., Local No.
38, 428 F. 2d 144 (CA6), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 943 (1970); United States v.
City of Chicago, 663 F. 2d 1354 (CA71981) (en bane); Firefighters Institute
v. City of St. Louis, 616 F. 2d 350, 364 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S.
938 (1981); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F. 2d 544, 553-554
(CA9), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 984 (1971); United States v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 625 F. 2d 918, 944 (CAlO 1979); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.
2d 257, 294 (CADC 1982).
There is strong support in the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, 86 Stat. 103, that Congress approved the use of raceconscious remedies under § 706(g). In those amendments, § 706(g) was
amended to clarify that "affirmative" relief is "not limited to" orders granting backpay and reinstatement, to make clear that a court may award
"other equitable relief" that it deems appropriate, and to specify an accrual
date for backpay. 86 Stat. 107. In re-enacting § 706(g) with its amendments, Congress expressly stated its intention to ratify the prevailing judicial interpretation of that provision. Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1844 (Comm. Print
1972). Prior to passage of the 1972 Amendments, several federal courts
had approved race-conscious action to remedy the effects of employment
discrimination. See e. g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.
2d, at 553-554; United States v. I.B.E.W., Local No . 38, 428 F. 2d, at
149-150; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F . 2d 123
(CA8 1969); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F. 2d 1047 (CA5
1969) .
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such relief is not to make whole any particular individual, but
rather to remedy the present class-wide effects of the past
discrimination. Because the discrimination sought to be alleviated by race-conscious relief is discrimination against a
class, rather than against identified members of the class,
such relief is provided to the class as a whole rather than to
its individual members. The relief can take many forms, but
it frequently imposes percentages-such as those contained
in the decree between the city and respondents-that require
race to be taken into account when an employer hires or promotes employees. The distinguishing feature of race-conscious relief is that no individual member of the disadvantaged class has a claim to it, and individual beneficiaries
of the relief need not show that they were themselves victims
of the discrimination for which the relief was granted.
In the instant case, respondents' request for a preliminary
injunction did not include a request for individual awards of
retroactive seniority-and the District Court did not make
any such awards. Rather, the District Court order merely
required the city to conduct its layoffs in a race-conscious
manner; specifically, the preliminary injunction prohibited
the city from conducting layoffs that would "decrease the
percentage of black[s]" in certain job categories. The city
remained free to lay off any individual black so long as the
percentage of black representation was maintained. As I
have explained, race-conscious remedies are commonly
awarded in 'htle VII suits and the Court offers no reason that b~c..~~~ .

kCAU. ~r~~;~ ~~*

~u..-~~~~
c a1ms a ria.
Because the pr eliminary injunction awarded only race-conscious relief to the class as a whole, the Court's focus on the
standard that Franks and Teamsters established for awarding individual relief is misdirected. Ironically, however, the
Court's conclusion that the preliminary injunction ordered
something that could not have been awarded at trial is wrong

$"~~
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even under the Franks and Teamsters analysis applied by
the Court. As the Court points out, th.e consent decree
arose out of a Title VII suit brought by respondents alleging
that the city had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against members of the plaintiff class. Mr.
Stotts, the named plaintiff, claimed that he and the class
members that he represented had been denied promotions
solely because of race, and that because of that discrimination, he and other members of the class had been denied their
rightful rank in the Memphis Fire Department. See Complaint of Respondents in No. 82-229, ~~9 and 10, App. 10.
Had respondent's case actually proceeded to trial, it would
have involved the now familiar two-stage procedure established in Teamsters and Franks. The first stage would be a
trial to determine whether the city had engaged in unlawful
discrimination; if so, the case would proceed to the second
stage, during which the individual members of the class
would have the opportunity to establish that they were victims of discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 371, 375.
The Court itself correctly indicates: "If individual members of
a plaintiff class demonstrate that they have been actual victims of the discriminatory practice, they may be awarded
competitive seniority and given their rightful place on the seniority roster." Ante, at 12. Were respondents to prevail
at trial on their claims of discrimination, therefore, they
might have obtained whatever "seniority award" the District
Court's preliminary injunction gave them. Thus, the
Court's conclusion is refuted by its own logic and by the very
cases on which it relies to come to its result.
For reasons never explained, the Court's opinion has focused entirely on what respondents have actually shown, instead of what they might have shown had they proceeded to
trial. It is absurd, however, to fault respondents for failing
to show "that any of the blacks protected from layoff had
been a victim of discrimination," ante, at 13, for the simple
reason that the claims on which such a showing would have
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been made never went to trial. The whole point of the consent decree in this case-and indeed the point of most Title
VII consent decrees-is to avoid the time and expense of litigating the question of liability and identifying the victims of
discrimination. Because the city has not conceded that it engaged in any unlawful discrimination, all the relief agreed to
in this consent decree-including the promotions and
backpay granted to specific individuals-was relief that went
to persons never determined to be actual victims. The
Court's logic makes all such relief inappropriate and completely destroys the incentives for entering into consent decrees. The Court today has altogether reversed its past position that "Congress expressed a strong preference for
encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S.
79, 88, n. 14 (1981); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 u. s. 36, 44 (1974).
As a final point, to the extent that the Court's invalidation
of the preliminary injunction relies on the last sentence of
§ 706(g), that reliance is misplaced. That sentence merely
prevents a court under certain circumstances from awarding
individual relief: "No order of the court shall require the . . .
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was . . . refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination" in violation of Title VII: This provision addresses the case where a violation of Title VII has been
shown, but the employer can show that a particular individual would not have received the job, promotion or reinstatement even in the absence of discrimination, that is, a lawful
reason justified the employment decision. Day v. Mathews,
530 F. 2d 1083, 1085 (CADC 1976); Patterson v. Greenwood
School District 50, 696 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA4 1982); King v. Laborers Int'l Union, Local No. 818, 443 F. 2d 273, 278-279
(CA6 1971). See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the
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Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective,
82 Colum. L. Rev. 292 (1982). The sentence, for example,
prevents a court from granting relief where an employment
decision is based in part upon race, but where the applicant is
unqualified for the job for non-discriminatory reasons. 16 In
that sense, the section provides an affirmative defense for an
employer to protect him from being ordered to hire someone
unqualified for the job. This provision has nothing to do
with limits on class-wide race-conscious relief. 17 To the ex16

In E.E.O.C. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, the Third Circuit
properly analyzed the section as follows:
"The last sentence in § 706(g) must be read in light of the settled construction of the rest of the section. That settled construction is that once a
prima facie showing is made that an employer has engaged in a practice
which violates Title VII, the burden shifts to it to prove that there is a
benign justification or explanation. The last sentence of § 706(g) says precisely that. Obviously, an employer can meet an individual charge by
showing that although that individual was a member of the disadvantaged
class he was also a thief, or a drunk or an incompetent, and was for such a
reason denied employment or promotion. But the sentence does not speak
at all to the showing that must be made by individual suitors, or class representatives on behalf of class members, or the EEOC on behalf of class
members. The sentence merely preserves the employer's defense that the
non-hire, discharge, or non-promotion was for a cause other than discrimination" (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 556 F. 2d, at 176.
17
The legislative history confirms this view. What is now 706(g) originated as § 707(e) in H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The original
version prevented a court from granting relief to someone that had been
refused employment, denied promotion, or discharged "for cause."
The
"for cause" provision clearly referred to what an employer must show to
establish that a particular individual should not be given relief. That language was amended by replacing "for cause" with "for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin,"
which was the version of the sentence as passed by the House. The author of the original version and of the amendment explained the meaning of
the amendment:
"[T]he purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here the court, for
example, cannot find any violation of the act which is based on facts
other-and I emphasize 'other'-than discrimination on the grounds of
race, color, religion, or national origin. The discharge might be based, for

..
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tent that the Court suggests otherwise, the Court is simply
wrong.
IV
By dissenting in this case, I do not mean glibly to suggest
that the District Court's preliminary injunction necessarily
was correct. Because it seems that the affected whites have
no contractual rights that were breached by the city's modified layoff plan, the effect of the preliminary injunction was
to shift the pain of the city's fiscal crisis on to innocent employees. This Court has recognized before the difficulty of
reconciling competing claims of innocent employees who
themselves are neither the perpetrators of discrimination nor
the victims of it. "In devising and implementing remedies
under Title VII, no less than in formulating any equitable decree, a court must draw on the 'qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private claims.'"
Teamsters, 431 U. 8., at 375, quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944). If the District Court's preliminary injunction was proper, it was because it accurately
assessed the equities in what was admittedly a zero-sum situation. If it was wrong, it was because a less painful way of
reconciling the competing claims was within the court's
power. In either case, the propriety of the action had nothing whatsoever to do with § 703(h) or with the last sentence of
§ 706(g).
example, on incompetence or a morals charge or theft, but the court can
only consider charges based on race, color, religion, or national origin.
That is the purpose of this amendment." 110 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Geller).
The only change in this sentence that took place in the Senate was the addition of "sex" as an illegitimate basis for discrimination ("sex" had unintentionally been omitted from the House version). It is clear, therefore, that
the sentence is relevant only in determining individual relief, and does not
affect a court's authority to mandate race-conscious affirmative relief to
remedy past discrimination.

-
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I dissent.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
The various views presented in the opinions in this case reflect the unusual procedural posture of the case and the difficulties inherent in allocating the burdens of recession and fiscal austerity. I concur in the Court's treatment of these
difficult issues, and write separately to reflect my understanding of what the Court holds today.

I
To appreciate the Court's disposition of the mootness issue,
it is necessary to place this case in its complete procedural
perspective. The parties agree that the District Court and
the Court of Appeals were presented with a "case or controversy" in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the Constitution. Respondents, as trial-plaintiffs, initiated the dispute, asking the District Court preliminarily to enjoin the
City from reducing the percentage of minority employees in
various job classifications within the Fire Department. Pe-
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titioners actively opposed that motion, arguing that respondents had waived any right to such relief in the consent decree
itself and, in any event, that the reductions-in-force were
bona fide applications of the citywide seniority system.
When the District Court held against them, petitioners followed the usual course of obeying the injunction and prosecuting an appeal. They were, however, unsuccessful on
that appeal.
Respondents now claim that the case has become moot on
certiorari to this Court. The recession is over, the employees who were laid off or demoted have been restored to their
former jobs, and petitioners apparently have no current need
to make seniority-based layoffs. The res judicata effects of
the District Court's order can be eliminated by the Court's
usual practice of vacating the decision below and remanding
with instructions to dismiss.
See United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950). Thus, respondents conclude that the validity of the preliminary injunction is
no longer an issue of practical significance and the case can be
dismissed as moot. See Brief of Respondents 26--28.
I agree with the Court that petitioners and respondents
continue to wage a controversy that would not be resolved by
merely vacating the preliminary injunction. As a result of
the District Court's order, several black employees have
more seniority for purposes of future job decisions and entitlements than they otherwise would have. This added seniority gives them an increased expectation of future promotion, an increased priority in bidding on certain jobs and job
transfers, and an increased protection from future layoffs.
These individuals, who are members of the respondent class,
have not waived their increased seniority benefits. Therefore, petitioners have a significant interest in determining
those individuals' claims in the very litigation in which they
were originally won. As the Court of Appeals noted, if peti-
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tioner-employer does not vigorously defend the implementation of the seniority system, it will have to cope with deterioration in employee morale, labor unrest, and reduced
productivity. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679
F. 2d 541, 555 and n. 12 (CA() 1982); see also Ford Motor Co.
v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 229 (1982). Likewise, if petitionerunion accedes to discriminatory employment actions, it will
lose both the confidence of its members and bargaining leverage in the determination of who should ultimately bear the
burden of the past (and future) fiscal shortages. See ante, at
7, and n. 5. Perhaps this explains why, in respondents'
words, "the city and union have expended substantial time
and effort ... in [an] appeal which can win no possible relief
for the individuals on whose behalf it has ostensibly been pursued." Brief for Respondents 44.
When collateral effects of a dispute remain and continue to
affect the relationship of litigants, 1 the case is not moot.
See, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S.
747, 755-757 (1976); Super Tire Engineering Co. v.
McCorkle, 416 U. S. 115, 121-125 (1974); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U. S. 368, 375-376 (1963). In such cases, the Court does
not hesitate to provide trial defendants with "a definitive disposition of their objections" on appeal, Pasadena City Bd.
of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 440 (1976), because
vacating the res judicata effects of the decision would not
'This case is distinguishable from University of Texas v. Camenisch,
451 U. S. 390 (1981), where the Court found that a petitioner's objections
to a preliminary injunction, which required it to pay for the respondent's
sign-language interpreter, were moot. In Camenisch, the propriety of issuing the preliminary injunction was really no longer of concern to the parties, and the real issue-who should pay for the interpreter-was better
handled in a separate proceeding. Id., at 394-398. In this case, because
the parties are in an ongoing relationship, they have a continuing interest
in the propriety of the preliminary relief itself. Camenisch expressly
distinguishes cases like this one, where the parties retain "a legally cognizable interest in the determination whether the preliminary injunction was
properly granted[.]" Id., at 394; see also id., at 397, and n. 2.
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bring the controversy to a close. See Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672, 1677-1687
(1970). As the Court wisely notes, "[litigants] cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal court ... and then insulate [the
effects of that court's] ruling .from appellate review by claiming that they are no longer interested in the matter." Ante,
at 9.
II

My understanding of the Court's holding on the merits also
is aided by a review of the place this case takes in the history
of the parties' litigation. The city entered into a consent decree with respondents, agreeing to certain hiring and promotional goals, backpay awards, and individual promotions.
The city was party both to another consent decree and to an
agreement with the union concerning application of the seniority system at the time it made these concessions. Respondents did not seek the union's participation in the negotiation of their consent decree with the city, did not include the
seniority system as a subject of negotiation, and waived all
rights to seek further relief. When the current dispute
arose, the District Court rejected respondents' allegation
that the seniority system had been adopted or applied with
any discriminatory animus. It held, however, that "modification" was appropriate because of the seniority system's discriminatory effects. Under these circumstances, the Court's
conclusion that the District Court had no authority to order
maintenance of racial percentages in the Department is, in
my view, inescapable.
Had respondents presented a plausible case of discriminatory animus in the adoption or application of the seniority
system, then the Court would be hard pressed to consider entry of the preliminary injunction an abuse of discretion. But
that is not what happened here. To the contrary, the District Court rejected the claim of discriminatory animus, and
the Court of Appeals did not disagree. Furthermore, the
District Court's erroneous conclusion to the contrary, main-
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tenance of racial balance in the Department could not be justified as a correction of an employment policy with an unlawful disproportionate impact. Title VII affirmatively protects
bona fide seniority systems, including those with discriminatory effects on minorities. . See American Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 65 (1982); Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977).
Therefore, the preliminary injunction could only be justified as a reasonable interpretation of the consent decree or as
a permissible exercise of the District Court's authority to
modify that consent decree. Neither justification was
present here. For the reasons stated by the Court, ante, at
11-13, and JUSTICE STEVENS, post, at 3, the consent decree
itself cannot fairly be interpreted to bar use of the seniority
policy or to require maintenance of racial balances previously
achieved in the event layoffs became necessary. Nor can a
district court unilaterally modify a consent decree to provide
retroactive relief that abrogates legitimate expectations of
other employees and applicants. Neither the federal antidiscrimination laws nor the inherent powers of equity authorize
courts to require an employer to adjust racial imbalances in
this way; indeed, they generally proscribe courts from doing
so. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-207
(1979); Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, supra,
427 U. S., at 43&-438. A court may not grant preferential
treatment to any individual or group simply because the
group to which they belong is adversely affected by a bona
fide seniority system. Rather, a court may use its remedial
powers, including its power to modify a consent decree, only
to prevent future violations and to compensate identified victims of unlawful discrimination. See Teamsters v. United
States, supra, at 367-371; Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S.
267, 28~281 (1977); see also University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 307-309, and n. 44 (POWELL,
J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Even when its
remedial powers are properly invoked, a district court may
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award preferential treatment only after carefully balancing
the competing interests of discriminatees, innocent employees, and the employer. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,
supra, 458 U. S., at 239-240; Teamsters v. United States,
supra, at 371-376. In sho~, no matter how significant the
change in circumstance, a district court cannot unilaterally
modify a consent decree to adjust racial balances in the way
the District Court did here. 2
To be sure, in 1980, respondents could have gone to trial
and established illegal discrimination in the Department's
past hiring practices, identified its specific victims, and possibly obtained retroactive seniority for those individuals. Alternatively, in 1980, in negotiating the consent decree, respondents could have sought the participation of the union, 3
negotiated the identities of the specific victims with the union
and employer, and possibly obtained limited forms of retroactive relief. But respondents did none of these things. They
chose to avoid the costs and hazards of litigating their claims.
They negotiated with the employer without inviting the
union's participation. They entered into a consent decree
without establishing any specific victim's identity. And,
most importantly, they waived their right to seek further relief. To allow respondents to obtain relief properly reserved
for only identified victims, or to prove their victim status
now, would undermine the certainty of obligation that is condition precedent to employers' acceptance of, and unions' consent to, employment discrimination settlements. See Steel2

Unlike the dissenters and JusTICE STEVENS, I find persuasive the
Court's reasons for holding Title VII relevant to analysis of the modification issue, see ante, at 13-14, and n. 12, and the Court's application of Title
VII's provisions to the facts of the present controversy.
3
"Absent a judicial determination, ... the Company[] cannot alter the
collective bargaining agreement without the Union's consent." W. R .
Grace & Co . v. Local 759, U. S. - , - (1983). Thus, if innocent
employees are to be required to make any sacrifices in the final consent
decree, they must be represented and have had full participation rights in
the negotiation process.
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workers v. Weber, 443 U. S., at 211 (BLACKMUN, J.,
concurring) (employers enter into settlements to avoid back
pay responsibilities and to reduce disparate impact claims).
Modifications requiring maintenance of racial balance would
not encourage valid settlements4 of employment discrimination cases. They would impede them. Thus, when the
Court states that this preferential relief could not have been
awarded even had this case gone to trial, see ante, at 17, it is
holding respondents to the bargain they struck during the
consent decree negotiations in 1980 and thereby furthering
the statutory policy of voluntary settlement. See Carsons
v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 88, and n. 14 (1981).
In short, the Court effectively applies the criteria traditionally applicable to the review of preliminary injunctions.
See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975).
When the Court disapproves the preliminary injunction issued in this case, it does so because respondents had no
chance of succeeding on the merits of their claim. The District Court had no authority to order the Department to
maintain its current racial balance or to provide preferential
treatment to blacks. It therefore abused its discretion. On
this understanding, I ~r in the tleeision Iendered today. " 1 01 rv
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'The policy favoring voluntary settlement does not, of course, countenance unlawful discrimination against existing employees or applicants.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273,
278-296 (1976) (Title VII and 42 U. S. C. § 1981 prohibit discrimination
against whites as well as blacks); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193,
208-209 (1979) (listing attributes that would make affirmative action plan
impermissible); cf. id., at 215 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) ("seniority is not
in issue because the craft training program is new and does not involve an
abrogation of pre-existing seniority rights").
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Consider Vernon Jordan's cab criterion. Jordan says: put Brad Rey11olds on
one street comer and me on the other.
Let us both hail a cab, and see at which
comer the cab stops. Jordan is black;
Reynolds, assistant attorney general for
civil rights, is white; and Jordan is right·
racism remains. He is wrong in arguing
that this justifies government policies
preferring one race.
Jordan recently attacked Reynolds
for a spe€ch in which Reynolds praised
.. the principle that was until recenlly the
cardinal tenet of the civil rights movement: that the use of race to justify
treating individuals differently can
never be legitimate. Jordan called the
· administration in which Reynolds
serves hostile "to black people and · to
. the very evncept of a decent society."_·
. WeU. In 1896, the. Supreme Court held
that Mr. Plessy, who was one-€ighth
black, could be excluded by law.. from
"white" railroad carriages. Jti~tice' John
M. Harlan dissented: "Our Constitution
is color blind._ .. The law ... takes no acCO\illt of ... color." In 1954, Thurgood
MarshaU, the NAACP's lawyer in the
school cases, said that alJ anyone could
reasonably want is that "children be assigned a school without regard to race or
· color." In debate about the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Hubert Humphrey said the ··
act "would prohibit preferential .treatment for any particular group.". , _.
. Until the late 1%05, Harlan's dissent .
expressed the ciVil rights movement's cis~ -..
piration. Then that movement began ·
seeking racial entitlements. As Alexander
Bickel wrot;;, suddenly Americans were
supposed to unlearn the lesson that discrimination on tile basis of race is inherently wroog, and to learn ''that this is oot
a matter of fundaR<entaJ principle but
only a matter of whose OX is gored:'' . ·: · .
II Harlan was right, .Reynolds isright
and Jordan is wrong. II Marshall was ·
right in 1954, he is wrong now when he
supports forced bu.Sing of children assigned to schools on the basis of skin pigmentation. If Humphrey was right iii
1964, the civil rights movement is v.rrong .
. in 1983. For associating himself v.~th Harlan, 'Marshall and Humphrey, Heynolds
is caJJed a racist. But the ferocity of the ·
atlacks does not disguise the apostasy of
tile attackers, or drown out tJ1is insistent
question: by what criteria wiU those who
now oppose a colorblind legal code say
the na~on is rea9y for such a code?
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d1scnmmatea agains( blacks, it nee<is a
"temporary period" of "positive discrimination" favoring blacks. But the period
will be perpetual. Jordan .says tl<e law
cannot be raciaUy neutral until "society"
is neutral And proof of society's neutrality will . be-what? Inevitably the criterion wiU be equality of attainment.
,
The NAACP's Benjamin Hooks cites
the paucity of blacks on corporate
boards and in u'niversity presidencies
and says reverse discrimination will be
needed until America "begins to treat
all of its citizens alike." Inevitably,
equal outcomes will be considered the
only proof of equal "treatment.":
Jordan says: "Colorb!indness makes
sense in a context of a society that has already dismantled its structures of discrinlination. Racial neutrality !'Rakes
sense in the context of a society in which
advantage does not accrue to any given
race." But the fact that "advantage" accrues unevenly among the races is Hot
proof of discriminatory "structures," aFld
certainly does not justify intentional discrimination by race_-based laws.
Policy certainly should strive to over:.
come what Jordan caJis "the ravages of.
unequal history." But not aU values
should be sacrificed to that. A thoroughly
integrated society is desirable; a colorblind legal code is, as the Civil rights
movement formerly said, mandatory.
Jordan rightly says that the wrong done
to past geoorations of blacks by statesanctioned discrimination was directed
against a caste, not individ'uals. He
wrongly says that that means the "remedy" can properly be a group remedy in- ·
volving racial entitlements for persons wJio·
are not victims of such discrimination and
injuring whites who are not guilty of discrimination. 'The fact that a contemporary
injury to whites-may be symmetrical with
a past injury to blocks does not dignify the
· injurious policy as a "remedy."
Jordan says racial preference for blacks
does not cause "undue hardship" for ilie
white majority. That is true in the sense
that the injury is done to a relatively few
individuals. But what is iiredeemably.pernicious about raciaUy based government'
action is precisely that it teaches disregard .
for individuals, and teaches the doctrine ·
that rights do not inhere in individuals but'
derive frOO< race membership.
To my friend, Vernon Jordan, I ask:,
do policies that legitimize racial think- .
ing, iliat taint black achievements and
stigmatize blacks as wards of the state, ~
in perpetuity, hasten the day when cab- ·
drivers will be colorblind?·
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Another Blunder
0~ Civil Rights
The Reagan White House, according to a
report by Juan Williams of The Post, was
"taken aback by the furor" over the president's proposed purge of the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission.
The Reagan White House is easily "taken
aback," especially by the hostile reaction to
symbolic blunders in civil-rights policy. The
summary discharge of three commission
members will incidentally leave it all white
except for its Reagan-appointed chairman,
Clarence Pendleton. That is vividly symbolic, but it is not substantively important.
In fact, it could have the ironic result of
restoring to the Civil Rights Commission a
notice and prestige it has forfeited by
chronic intemperance and irrelevance. Con. gress created the commission in 1957 to
document shortcomings in equal protecction.
Its early work, especially through investigations by state advisory bodies, was helpful
and occasionally distinguished. Since then,
however, the commission has become a ·
buzzing gadf1y.
President Reagan will no doubt be "taken
aback" when his attempt to swat a pest
borne in silence by other presidents adds to
the impression that he is hostile to black interests. But it's the Voting Rights renewal
story all over again.
Two years ago, the president dithered
while Congress debated the issue of renewing and strengthening the 1965 act. When
Reagan finally weighed in with an opinion, .
renewal was a fait accompli; nothing was left"
to be decided.
,
.
. Reagan's dilatoriness on the voting rights
issue was, as The Post story interestingly
li notes, matched by that of the Civil Rights
Commission. While the commission investi' gated issues of little interest to the great
mass of underemployed blacks (e.g., ini- .
nority employment on TV networks and in
high-tech industry), it failed to file a report
on voting rights on time.
At least two of the three new Reagan
nominees to the commission-Morris
Abram and John H. Bunzel-have long
records of civil-rights activism, excellent as
such records were measured before the divisive issue of "reverse discrimination" intruded. Their skepticism of that double-edged

remedy for racial wrongs, which drew the
notice of Reagan White House officials, will
probably be the point of attack upon them.
It will need to be vigorously rebuffed.
For apart from insensitivity to the symbolic aspect of civil rights, the Reagan ad- ·
ministration's Achilles' heel has been its- fa11-ure to clarify the crucial differepce between -~
"affirmative action" (which is perfectly consistent with color-blindness in the law) and
"reverse discrimination" (which is not).
Color-blindness-the term was made
memorable by the first Justice Harlan in his
heroic dissent in Plessy u. Ferguson-is a
legal term of art of specific meaning. It is .not
the rigid pretense that embedded racial
wrongs never require nor justify speciar <;on.~ :.
cern. Color-blindness instead condemns·
legal remedies that purport to redress;past:
wrongs by creating new categories of firs~-: :
and second-class citizenship.
··- ··
There is some hope that the new corrimis! :
sion members, if confirmed, may correct1be ' ·
confusion. Neither Abram nor Bunzel, ·as a
....
I
May 25 interview with the press shows., · is
,
confused about these critical distinctions QO.r
intimidated · by the campaign to mu?d;r
them, In Bunzel's words, the distinctiop qetween affirmative action and reverse ' ais:
crimination "is the distinction between com:;
pensatory action ... and racially prefen:;n.tiai
treatment."
.,. .; •· '
Examples of legitimate affirmative acti,pn'
-ranging from programs like Head Start·
and Upward Bound to the recognitiort .of ·
race as one (of many) "pluses" in consider-.
ing a college application-abound. No .such
measures require invidious categorization of
other persons or groups.
· ~,
Affirmative action, in short, needs rescuing from the polemical distortions of ·\)o:th
friends and foes who slyly or ignorantly '
equate it with reverse discrimination- And
quota systems. .
·: · ..
Can the White House manage the rescue
effort? One occasionally has the impression
that no one at 1600 Pennsylvanian Ave., including the president, has followed the unfolding civil-rights debate since about 1970.
That may explain why the White House is
often "taken aback" by the reaction to
maneuvers that others see as blunders. •

.
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